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ABSTRACT 
Arbitrage lies in the core of many finance theories. It eliminates any mispricing and brings 
prices to fundamental values, keeping markets efficient. In reality, however, there exist 
various barriers to arbitrage that deter potential arbitrageurs from correcting the relative 
mispricing in a timely manner. While the existence and consequences of some direct 
barriers, such as capital controls and short-sales restriction, are evident and straightforward, 
other barriers are less obvious and indirect in nature but with the same effect of 
discouraging arbitrage activity. This paper investigates the role of various direct and 
indirect barriers to arbitrage in the persistence of relative mispricing with a sample of 
shares listed both on Hong Kong Stock Exchange and one of China’s stock exchanges.  
 
Time-series and cross-company fluctuations in price difference of the sample of cross-listed 
shares are investigated. It is found that the reduction of direct barriers has a significantly 
negative impact on the aggregate level of pricing difference, and that direct and indirect 
barriers to arbitrage can explain collectively 54% of the cross-sectional variation in pricing 
difference. The estimates are significant even after controlling for firm size, listing year and 
performance. The findings in this paper provide an alternative explanation for China’s 
foreign share discount, especially for the persistence of relative mispricing. This study also 
sheds lights on the pricing of noise trader risk argued in Lee, Shleifer & Thaler (1991) but 
proved otherwise in empirical studies. Specifically, the result confirms the notion that both 
idiosyncratic and systematic risk matter in arbitrageurs’ positions, particularly when the 
markets under concern are relatively segmented.  
 
KEYWORDS: Arbitrage, Capital Controls, Short sales constraint, Noise trader, Indirect 
barriers, Cross-listed Shares. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Motivation and Research Question 
 
The concept of arbitrage-free is at the core of our beliefs about finance theory. In particular, 
two assets with identical payoffs should share the same price. If this balance is violated for 
extended period of time, then two conditions must be met. First, there exist direct barriers 
that limit potential arbitrageurs from eliminating the relative mispricing, such as foreign 
ownership restrictions, high transaction costs, heavy taxes and short-sale constraints (e.g. 
Miller 1977; Figlewski 1981; Eun & Janakiramanan 1986; Errunza & Losq 1985; Hietala 
1989; Bodurtha et al. 1995; Stulz & Wasserfallen 1995; Bris et al. 2007). It is well-
documented that liberalization of markets with more artificial restrictions gives rise to a 
more consistent pricing among markets (e.g. Gultekin et al. 1989; Bonser-Neal et al. 1990; 
Mittoo 1992; Bailey, Chung & Kang 1999; Bekaert & Harvey 2000; Karolyi, Li & Liao 
2009). Second, various indirect barriers to arbitrage, such as information asymmetry, noise 
trader risk and agency problems, are in effect that render arbitrage positions costly or risky 
and thus deter any arbitrage behavior (e.g. Delong et al. 1990; Lee, Shleifer & Thaler 1991; 
Pontiff 1996; Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Pontiff 2006; Kondor 2009). This paper evaluate the 
impact of various direct and indirect barriers to arbitrage on the pricing difference with a 
sample of companies that issue shares both on Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) and on 
China’s newly established stock markets.   
 
Yet another motivation for this paper is to address the puzzle of China’s foreign share 
discount from a different perspective. Similar to the more frequently investigated B-shares 
in China’s stock market, the class of shares discussed in this paper, issued by Chinese 
companies and listed on HKSE, also serves as unrestricted foreign shares in the face of 
strict investment barriers in China. In a comprehensive examination of the impact of 
foreign investment restriction on asset pricings, Bailey, Chung and Kang (1999) note that 
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shares available to foreign investors exhibit price premiums over those shares restricted to 
domestic investors in all segmented markets except China. Various hypotheses have been 
put forward to explain this foreign share discount in China along with the more general 
foreign share premium. Fernald and Rogers (2002) attributes the premium of China’s 
domestic shares to the lack of alternative investment opportunities for retail investors in 
China, which, coupled with high household savings rate, results in their willingness to 
accept a lower required rate of return, a higher price, than foreign investors. Mei, 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) analyze non-fundamental components in Chinese stock 
prices and argue that speculative trading is responsible for the high premium of A-share 
markets. Wang and Jiang (2004) add to the evidence of segmented markets and document 
that H-shares exhibit significant exposure to Hong Kong market factors and behave more 
like Hong Kong stocks than Chinese stocks even though they are issued by Chinese 
companies who base their business in China.  
 
Direct barriers to arbitrage in this case are evident in that (1) different classes of shares are 
issued by the same company but not fungible. In other words, trading can take place within 
group of investors but not among groups; (2) short-sales are prohibited in China’s stock 
market. The deregulation of B-share market in 2001, which allows domestic investors with 
required foreign currencies to invest in B-share market previously designated to foreign 
investors, provides a good example of what would happen when the first direct barrier is 
lifted. It is observed that this change of regulation results in a dramatic decline of B-share 
discount from 75% to 8% on average (Karolyi, Li & Liao 2009). However, the pricing 
difference remains and differs among companies, drawing us to explore the influence of 
various indirect barriers to arbitrage that deter arbitrageurs from eliminating relative 
mispricing even when they are no longer restricted to do so.  
 
The two direct barriers are also present until recently in our case of Hong Kong listed 
China’s shares, although Hong Kong stock market is a well-established market without any 
restrictions on foreign investment and short selling activity. First, China has strict capital 
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control and the A-share market is off-limit to foreign investors until 2002 upon introduction 
of the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) program which allows foreign 
institutional investors to participate in China’s A-share market. Similarly, Chinese investors 
cannot invest overseas until 2006 with the launch of Qualified Domestic Institutional 
Investors (QDII) program that enables qualified domestic funds to invest in foreign 
financial markets. Besides, when China’s B-share market is deregulated in 2001, the second 
direct barrier, restrictions on short-sales in A-share market, is still binding. With or without 
influence, the differential pricing between domestic A- and foreign B-shares is solved by 
Chinese investors’ bidding up B-share prices instead of correcting the notorious 
overvaluation associated with A-shares. As a consequence, it is natural to argue that, the 
abolishment of short selling restriction may impact the relative pricing status between 
domestic and foreign shares in a way different from the resolution in B-share market.  
 
1.2. Main Findings 
 
Using a quasi-event study approach similar to that used in Nishiotis (2004), it is found that 
the removal or reduction of these two direct barriers to arbitrage has a significantly impact 
on the aggregate price difference of two share series concerned. The increased level of 
openness of China’s stock market proxied by the increasing amount of capital flows 
appropriated under QFII program significantly reduce the seriousness of relative mispricing 
in two markets. Furthermore, the abolishment of short-sales restrictions realized in a 
multiple-step process act also has a negative and increasingly larger impact on the pricing 
differences.  
 
Nonetheless, similar to the case of China’s B-shares, the pricing gap remains and varies 
across firms even though direct barriers are lifted or significantly mitigated. As the next 
step, the impact of various indirect barriers to arbitrage identified by existing literature on 
the persistence of such pricing difference and its cross-sectional variation is investigated. 
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Using three proxies for indirect barrier to arbitrage - noise trader risk, volatility of the 
difference and concentration of ownership – it is documented that the long-term cross-
sectional price difference is positively correlated with all three measures of indirect barriers, 
even after controlling for various firm characteristics. Particularly, the higher the 
idiosyncratic risk, the more volatile the price difference, and the less dispersed the 
shareholder base, the more severe the relative mispricing. The result also shows that the 
impact of various indirect barriers to arbitrage on the pricing in two markets is no less than 
that exerted by two direct barriers. Collectively, proxies for direct and indirect barriers in 
our study explain 54% of the cross-company variation in price difference of cross-listed 
shares. This result surpasses the highest cross-sectional explanatory power of 46% 
documented in Chan, Menkveld & Yang (2008) in their attempt to explain the price 
premium of domestic A-shares relative to foreign B-shares using various proxies for 
information asymmetry.  
 
1.3. Contributions 
 
The findings of this paper contribute, in different ways, to three lines of literature. The first 
and most straightforward one is that it provides an alternative explanation for China’s 
foreign share discount, especially the persistence of the pricing difference. During the last 
decade, much attention has been gathered around this “anomaly” and efforts have been 
made to explore the time-varying price difference at the index level (Arquette et al. 2008; 
Seasholes & Liu 2011), comovement between A- and H-share prices (Peng, Miao & Chow 
2007) and with the respective stock market (Wang & Jiang 2004), spillover effect of returns 
(Li, Yi & Su 2011; Qiao, Chiang & Wong 2008), the impact of listing H-shares on the price 
difference between A-and B-shares (Sun & Tong 2000) and the influence of B-share 
market’s deregulation on the average price difference (Kayoli, Li & Liao 2009). At the firm 
level, links have been established between the price difference and (1) turnover (Mei, 
Scheinkman & Xiong 2003) which can be further broken down to trading volume (Chan, 
Menkveld & Yang 2008) and relative supply of shares (Chan & Kwok 2005); (2) market 
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capitalization (Mei, Scheinkman & Xiong; Chan & Kwok 2005); (3) state ownership 
(Fernald & Rogers 2002); and  (4) information asymmetry (Chan, Menkveld & Yang 2008). 
This paper extends these studies by controlling for those well-established factors and 
investigating the cross-company variation in price difference in a more detailed way and 
from another perspective. The analyses performed in this paper are based on one single 
notion that arbitrage should eliminate any relative mispricing however it is formed in the 
first place. Following this idea, we identify various direct and indirect barriers to arbitrage 
evident in China’s current stock market or suggested in recent literature on costly arbitrage 
and sustained anomalies (Lee, Shleifer & Thaler 1991; Pontiff 1996; Shleifer & Vishny 
1997; Gemmill & Thomas 2002; Pontiff 2006; Kondor 2009) and then use them to explain 
the time-series and cross-sectional price difference of cross-listed A- and H-shares.  
Throughout the literature, the pricing discrepancy is most successfully attributed to trading 
behavior in two markets and the supply of shares in respective market. Little has pointed to 
recent liberalizations in China’s stock market as ways mitigating the pricing inconsistency 
in two markets. Neither have them attributed the continued pricing discrepancy, especially 
after explicit restrictions on arbitrage have been removed or loosened, to any less-obvious 
barriers to arbitrage that put the seemingly noticeable money on the table without being 
exploited.  
 
By examining the effect of relaxing two restrictions in China’s financial market on the price 
difference of cross-listed shares, this paper also extends another strand of study, namely the 
economic benefits of emerging market’s financial liberalizations. Empirical studies around 
the world show that market liberalizations in the form of overseas listing, formation of 
country funds and relaxation on equity capital controls and foreign investment cast 
significant influence on the financial market under such reforms. Using data from Japan’s 
stock market, Gultekin et al. (1989) show that price of risk in U.S. and Japanese markets 
was different before, but not after, the major regime switch in December 1980 that virtually 
eliminated capital controls on Japanese equity markets. More recently, studies concerning 
emerging economies that liberalize their financial markets in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
shepherded by Errunza and Miller (2000), Henry (2000) and Bekaert and Harvey (2000), 
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all point to a lowered cost of capital of the liberalizing stock market, lending support to the 
notion that liberalization allows for risk sharing between domestic and foreign agents. 
Particularly related to the present study is the effect of market liberalization on pricing 
consistency with more advanced markets. Since test of market efficiency are frequently 
subject to Fama’s (1976) joint hypothesis, asserting that the rejection of market efficiency 
may equally due to a wrong asset pricing model or the inefficiency of the market, samples 
are hard to form to test the potential efficiency gains of various financial reforms. The 
group of cross-listed shares focused in this paper, for which identical pricing is demanded 
by Law of One Price which is further guaranteed by arbitrage, provides a good opportunity 
without being bonded by the common pitfall of joint hypothesis. By linking the two 
reforms to relative mispricing of cross-listed shares, we are the first, to the best of our 
knowledge, to formally test the validity of these reforms in China’s stock market. The 
results show that increasing openness of China’s stock market, as proxied by the increased 
amount of free capital flows, has been beneficial to a narrowing pricing gap with respect to 
the well-established Hong Kong stock market.  
 
Last but not least, this paper extends the evidence of costly arbitrage in cases of sustained 
mispricing, of which idiosyncratic risk is of particular importance and encounters 
substantial controversy. Studies stemming from Delong et al. (1990) consider noise trader 
sentiment as a systematic risk factor that causes the relative mispricing and also prevents 
arbitrageurs from forcing the price to theoretical values (Lee, Shleifer & Thaler 1991; 
Gemmill & Thomas 2002; Baker & Wurgler 2006). By acknowledging so they downplay 
the role of idiosyncratic risks since they are believed to be easily diversified away and thus 
should not be priced. In contrast, studies following Shleifer and Vishny (1997), which 
examine arbitrage behaviors in a more realistic context, argue that arbitrageurs are 
generally faced with limited resources and are not diversified. Thus, assets with high 
idiosyncratic risk will be intentionally avoided by rational arbitrageurs and thus subject to 
prolonged mispricing (Pontiff 1996; Wurgler & Zhuravskaya 2002; Ali et al. 2003; 
Mendenhall 2004; Pontiff 2006). This paper examines this problem in an emerging market 
flooded with retail investors and in a context of cross-listed shares. The results lend support 
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to Shleifer and Vishny’ s (1997) model of limited-amount of not-diversified arbitrageurs 
and shows that idiosyncratic risk matters more in an arbitrageur’s position, especially in an 
international arena where markets are not fully integrated.  
 
1.4. Structure of the Paper 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the institutional 
background and some recent liberalization in China’s A-share market. Section III 
constructs the theoretical framework of this study and presents some literature pertaining to 
the issues concerned. Section IV introduces the sample of cross-listed shares and dataset 
used in later empirical analyses. Section V formally tests whether various direct and 
indirect barriers to arbitrage can explain time-series and cross-firm fluctuations in the 
pricing difference. Section VI concludes. 
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2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND DATA 
 
2.1. Multiple Equity Series 
 
In the short history of Chinese stock markets, China is characterized by the coexistence of 
multiple stock classes. Every kind of shares emerges in a certain political and economic 
context and is closely linked to the development of the market itself and the economy as a 
whole.  Three main types of equity shares issued by Chinese firms are A-shares, B-shares 
and H-shares. They were all formed in the 1990s following the establishments of Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in 1990 and 1991 
respectively. In addition to the three most common classes of shares, there are also so-
called N-shares, S-shares and L-shares, standing for the stock exchange where they are 
listed and traded, like N-shares for stocks listed in NYSE and S-shares for stocks listed in 
Singapore Stock Exchange. Here reviews in detail the denomination and background of the 
three main classes of shares, which are most relevant to the present study. 
 
A-shares: They are the common shares listed and traded on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges, issued by Chinese companies and denominated in local currency, RMB. They 
exist since the formation of the two domestic stock markets. The purchasing and trading of 
A-shares are restricted to Chinese citizens only. Upon the introduction of QFII program in 
2002, certain foreign institutional investors approved by the Chinese security authority 
CRSR are allowed to invest in the domestic A-share markets. The historical and current 
rules guiding investments by these foreign institutional investors are reviewed in the next 
part.   
 
B-shares: They are shares issued by Chinese companies (many of them issue A-shares for 
domestic investors as well), listed on the same exchanges as A-shares, and eligible for 
foreign investor, individual or institutional alike. They are denominated in RMB, but traded 
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in foreign currencies (US dollar in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Hong Kong dollar in 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange). The idea of B-share market was formed by the authority in 
1992 to attract foreign capitals through ways other than FDI and long-term borrowing. The 
first B-share was issued in the same year.  
 
H-shares: They are issued by Chinese companies, listed and traded on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange. They are denominated in Hong Kong dollars, which are pegged to the U.S. 
dollars and are no different than other companies listed on HKSE. The first H-share IPO 
was conducted in June 1993, not long after the introduction of B-shares, as another way to 
raise foreign funds and to bond state owned large companies with more advanced listing 
environment. 
 
As more companies successfully conducted their IPOs in HKSE, the authority began to pay 
attention to more remote foreign exchanges and list large national companies in U.S., 
London, and Singapore etc. These shares are termed then, out of habit, as N-shares, L-
shares, and S-shares accordingly.  Table 1 reviews the first time listings of Chinese firms in 
domestic B-share market and in distinct overseas stock markets. 
 
Table 1. First IPOs in overseas markets (except for B-share) 
This table reviews the first IPO in foreign stock markets and China’s B-share market which is designated 
to foreign investors. Shares issued by Chinese companies but listed and traded in Hong Kong, New York, 
London, Singapore Stock Exchange are referred to H-shares, N-shares, L-shares and S-shares 
respectively.   
 
 Listing Venues Time of IPO Company Sector 
 Shanghai (B-share) February 1992  INESA Electron  Industry-Electronics 
 Hong Kong June 1993 Tsingtao Brewery   Consumer-Beverages 
 New York August 1994 HuaNeng Power Intl.  Utilities-Electric 
 London March 1997 Datang Power Generation  Utilities -Electric 
 Singapore May 1997 ZhongXin Pharmaceuticals Consumer-Pharmaceuticals 
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Aside from the aforementioned ones, there is another series of shares that is very similar to 
H-shares, with the only difference being that the issuing firms of these shares are Chinese 
companies incorporated in Hong Kong and issuing firms of H-shares are Chinese 
companies incorporated in mainland China. These shares are called “Red Chips”. As of 
December 2012, Red chips and H-shares collectively constitute 57.4% of market 
capitalization on Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE website).  
 
Unlike other emerging markets that generally cross list their companies to foreign markets 
after or in the same pace with liberalization of domestic markets, China cross list their 
companies long before it relaxed capital inflow control through QFII program in 2002. As a 
result, it constitutes a unique case that all share series other than A-shares can be regarded 
as “unrestricted shares” in China under strict foreign ownership restrictions in the A-share 
market. However, empirical researches in this area mainly focus on the B-share market 
when it comes to China, ignoring the fact that those foreign listed shares are perfect 
substitutes for B-shares and are readily available to foreign investors who want to have a 
stake in the growth of Chinese companies, without leaving the regulatory environment of 
more developed financial markets. Sun and Tong (2000) document this effect by showing 
that when more H-shares and red chips are listed in Hong Kong, foreign investors move 
away from the B-share market and the B-share discount, relative to A-share price, becomes 
larger.  
 
A more serious problem associated with the B-share market is its illiquidity, especially 
when more and more Chinese companies list their shares overseas, diminishing the B-share 
market’s ability to attract capital in the international market. The capitalization and 
turnover were very low compared to that of the H-shares and Red chips and the authority 
ceased to accept IPO applications in the B-share market since October 2000. The 
deregulation of B-share market on February 2001 that allows Chinese residents with 
foreign currencies to trade B-shares, although mitigating the pricing discrepancy between 
A- and B- shares to a large extent as pointed out in several articles, fail to activate the 
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market and the market condition remain illiquid till now. Recently in December 2012, 
China International Marine Containers Corporation becomes the first to switch its B-shares 
on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange to H-shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Given 
the aforementioned reasons, this paper focuses on the pricing discrepancy between A-
shares and their foreign listed counterparts, among which H-shares constitute the vast 
majority.  
 
2.2. Recent Liberalizations on China’s A-share Market 
 
Hong Kong is a world city and an open market and it is stipulated in the Basic Law, Hong 
Kong’s mini-constitution, that “No foreign exchange control policies shall be applied in the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China. The Hong Kong dollar shall be freely 
convertible,” and “The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall 
safeguard the free flow of capital within, into and out of the Region.” As a result, it is 
natural to argue that the pricing consistency of cross-listed shares lies in the liberalization 
of China’s A-share market. While two kinds of direct barriers preventing arbitrage 
activities discussed when review the literature, inaccessibility of market and short-sale 
constraint, are all binding in Chinese stock market until recently, we elaborate in what 
follows the regulations removing or relaxing these barriers to arbitrage.  
 
2.2.1. Relaxation of Capital Controls: A Primer on QFII Scheme 
 
In order to open domestic stock market in an orderly manner, China introduced the QFII 
program in 2002. This practice has been adopted by a few emerging economies, such as 
Taiwan and Korea, during their opening-up process to protect them from excessive 
turbulence and speculative behavior (Ernest & Yuong, 2013).  
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On 1
th
 December 2002, People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) jointly issued the <Interim Measures on the Administration of 
Securities Investments in China by Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors> (Decree 12 of 
PBOC and CSRC), which officially initiated the pilot program in the QFII regime. This 
Interim Measure serves as temporary regulatory guideline in the early stage of this program.  
According to Decree 12, QFII are defined as overseas fund management institutions, 
insurance companies, securities companies and other assets management institutions which 
have been approved by CSRC and granted investment quota by the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange (SAFE) to invest in China's A-share market. Several aspects are 
considered by the CSRC in qualifying QFIIs, such as financial stability, credit ratings, risk 
control mechanism, qualification of employees, corporate governance structure and internal 
control system. Generally, the CSRC tries to exclude potential speculators and attract more 
long-term foreign investment funds. Rules of important issues dictated in the Decree 12 are 
summarized in Table 2.  
 
However, the CSRC and SAFE have been very strict on eligibility requirements for QFIIs 
and their investment quotas, leading to a relatively small aggregate size of QFIIs in China’s 
securities markets. On 24 August 2006, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE) along with CSRC, PBOC jointly released the <Measures on the Administration of 
Securities Investments in China by Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors>, replacing the 
Interim Measures to be the main regulatory guidance. On the same day, the CSRC released 
the <Notice on the Issues related to the Implementation of the Measures on the 
Administration of Securities Investments in China by Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors> to explain in more detail essential matters in the Measures. Compared with the 
old Interim Measures, the new Measures significantly lowered the threshold of QFII’s 
investments and streamlined the application process. 
 
The Measures was further revised on July 27, 2012, expressing the authorities’ continued 
interest in opening of China’s securities markets, especially by lowering the qualification   
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Table 2. Summary of QFII regulatory framework 
This table reviews key requirements regarding the QFII qualification and regulatory procedures under this 
program.  The table is revised and summarized from the <Interim Measures on the Administration of 
Securities Investments in China by Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors> (Decree 12 of PBOC and 
CSRC).  
Aspects Regulations 
Quota 
Application 
An application for a single QFII investment quota should be no less than an amount 
equivalent to USD 50 million for each time, and no more than an amount equivalent to 
USD 1 billion in total, except for sovereign wealth funds, central banks and monetary 
authorities. 
Custody 
QFII should mandate domestic commercial banks as custodians and domestic securities 
companies as brokers for their domestic securities trading. 
Investment 
Accounts 
With the approval of the investment quota by SAFE, the QFIIs can open a foreign 
exchange account for its own funds or for its client’s funds for which it provides asset 
management services at its custodian bank. Then QFII should open RMB special deposit 
account related to its foreign exchange account, according to the quota approved by 
SAFE.  
Funds in the QFIIs’ foreign exchange accounts and RMB account shall not be used for any 
purposes other than domestic securities investments. 
Lock-up 
Period  
For those QFIIs such as pension funds, insurance funds, mutual funds, charity funds, 
endowment funds, government and monetary authorities, and open-ended China funds* 
initiated and established by QFII, the lock-up period of the principal (during which QFIIs 
are forbidden from remitting the principal abroad) is 3 months; for other type of QFIIs, the 
lock-up period is 1year.  
*Open-ended China funds refer to open-ended securities investment funds that are 
established abroad in public offerings, with over 70% of the funds invested in China.  
Scope of 
Investment 
QFII can invest, within quota, on the following RMB financial instruments: Shares listed 
in China’s stock exchanges (excluding B-shares); Treasuries listed in China’ stock 
exchanges; Convertible bonds and enterprise bonds listed in China’s stock exchanges; 
Other financial instruments as approved by CSRC.  
Ownership 
Restriction 
Shares held by each QFII in one listed company should not exceed 10% of total 
outstanding shares of the company; Total shares held by all QFII in one listed company 
should not exceed 20% of total outstanding shares of the company.  
 
requirements applicable to QFIIs, enlarging the scope of investments, and facilitating the 
investment activities by giving them greater investment latitude and improving convenience 
of account management. For example, the prior ownership restriction of all foreign 
investors in a single company is 20% as prescribed in Decree 12. This limit was relaxed on 
July 2012 to 30%. However, the ownership restriction of each foreign institution has not 
changed and remains as 10%. The increasing openness can also be observed from the 
changes of the total quota under the QFII program assigned by SAFE. Table 3 reviews the 
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three major adjustments of quota since the inauguration of the program and the number of 
qualified institutional investors by the time of each adjustment.  
 
Table 3. Increase of total quota under QFII program and number of institutions 
This table reviews the three major adjustments of total quota of foreign investment in China’s A-share 
market under the QFII program since its inauguration and the number of qualified institutional investors 
by the time of each adjustment. 
 Quota (in U.S. dollar) No. of Institutions 
Inception $ 1.7 billion 12 
July 2005 $ 10 billion 33 
December 2007 $ 30 billion 51 
April 2012 $ 80 billion 170 
          Source: SAFE website 
 
It needs to mention that it is argued in this paper that QFIIs are potential arbitrageurs since 
they have both accesses to the two stock markets. The same is true for domestic 
institutional investors under QDII scheme which is introduced in 2006 and enables certain 
amount of free capital outflows. Besides, literature shows that outgoing Chinese funds have 
strong “home bias” towards Hong Kong stock market. However, due to data limitation, we 
are able to monitor investment behavior of foreign institutional investors but not of 
domestic outgoing institutional investors. Thus this question is left to further researches.  
 
Another link between two markets were established upon the introduction of RMB 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (RQFII) program on December 2011, allowing 
Hong Kong subsidiaries of mainland brokerages and fund management firms to raise 
offshore RMB to invest in the mainland bond and A-share markets. The program is 
formulated in the context of increasing use of RMB as transaction currency in cross-border 
activities and as an attempt by the government to accelerate the backflow of offshore RMB 
funds (Wang, Gao & Chen 2013). However, since RQFII funds could invest in up to 20% 
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of their assets in index funds while the remaining 80% is restricted to fixed income 
products as of the end of our sample period, the impact on the issue we study is thus limited. 
 
2.2.2. Abolishment of Short-Sale Constraints 
 
The short sale ban long-standing in Chinese stock market has been lifted gradually during 
the past few years starting from March 2010 along with the introduction of margin trading. 
The removals of limit were not implemented universally among stocks. Rather, like the 
procedure adopted by Hong Kong Stock Exchange in the 1990s (see an introduction in 
Change, Cheng & Yu 2007), a greater amount of stocks were added to a list of stocks 
eligible for short at a time. The first announcement on March 2010, also served as a trial 
program, included the stocks that constitute SSE 50 Index, covering the largest 50 stocks 
listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange. They are mostly state-owned and very liquid. The 
subsequent major addition on November 2011 enlarged the scope of shortable shares to 180 
component stocks of SSE 180 Index. The final adjustment on January 2013 increased the 
amount to 300 stocks traded either on Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. Table 4 reviews these adjustments and the content of changes.  
 
In addition to the index constituent requirement, stocks must satisfy certain liquidity criteria 
to be included in the list. For example, according to the guidance released by CRCS, the 
floating market capitalization (not subject to non-tradable restrictions) is no less than 800 
million RMB ($129 million dollar); the number of shareholders is no less than 4000; daily 
turnover is not lower than that of the benchmark index by 15% during the past three months 
and daily dollar turnover is not less than 50 million RMB ($8 million dollar) during the past 
three months.  
 
Although the ban was lifted, from the supply side, the market for stock lending was still 
limited in that brokerages were not yet allowed to borrow stocks from long-term 
institutional investors. They could only lend out stocks for short selling activity from their   
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Table 4. Changes of stocks eligible for short-sales 
This table reviews the adjustments of regulation toward short-sales and the content of changes. The short 
selling ban in China’s stock market has been lifted gradually starting from March 2010. Like the 
procedure adopted by Hong Kong Stock Exchange in the 1990s, a greater amount of stocks are added to 
a list of stocks eligible to sell short at a time. The first announcement on March 2010, also serve as a trial 
program, include the stocks that constitute SSE 50 Index, covering the largest 50 stocks listed on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange. A subsequent major addition enlarges the scope to 180 component stocks of 
SSE 180 Index. The final adjustment on January 2013 increase the amount to 300 stocks traded either on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  
 Adjustment Date Eligible Stocks for Short-Sales 
 March 2010 50 constituent stocks of SSE 50 Index 
 November 2011 180 constituent stocks of SSE 180 Index 
 *January 2013 300 stocks on SHSE and SZSE 
                          *This major adjustment is beyond the sample period of this study and thus not  
                           counted in the empirical section.   
 
 
own inventories. To solve this problem and further facilitate margin trading and short 
selling activity, an intermediary stock lending company, China Securities Finance 
Corporation (CSFC), was established in October 2011, indicating China’s solution towards 
a central counterparty in stock lending marketplaces. It is allowed to borrow securities from 
institutions, including fund management companies and insurers, and to re-lend securities 
to brokerages. Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange and China Securities 
Depository & Clearing Corporation maintain the majority ownership of this central 
intermediary.  However, as the sample period ends in 2012, the CSFC only launched 
program concerning re-lending of money to brokerages to promote margin trading. On the 
short selling side, the supply of securities is still limited to the inventory of brokerages. As 
a result, in this initial stage, it is natural to have doubts toward the arbitrage potential of 
short sellers in the presence of large price differentials from their fundamental values.  
Nonetheless, our detailed data regarding short selling activity still document active trading 
behavior on many stocks included in our sample.  
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE 
 
In this paper two main questions are essentially explored. First, whether and why the 
average pricing difference varies across time? Second, whether and why the pricing 
differences differ among firms. While theories have been put forward and empirical studies 
have been performed to answer these two questions, in the present study time-varying and 
cross-sectional variation of difference are related to various limits of arbitrage that make 
the difference last. Those barriers are either common to all firms during a certain period of 
time or exerting different impact on firms with distinct characteristics. Although the 
existence and consequences of some direct barriers, such as capital controls and short sales 
restriction, are evident and straightforward, other barriers are less obvious and indirect in 
nature but with the same effect of discouraging arbitrage activity.  In 3.1 of this section the 
discussion is around the sources that might generate pricing differences in the first place. In 
3.2 and 3.3 theoretical and empirical studies on the limits and costs of arbitrage are 
reviewed to isolate factors that might make pricing differences last.  
 
3.1. Asset Pricing in Segmented Markets 
 
Stulz (1981) defines capital market to be integrated internationally if assets of equal risk 
located in different countries yield equal expected returns on a currency-adjusted basis. 
Literature on international pricing under various cross-border investment barriers theorize 
that pricing of identical shares can differ due to differential demand and relative scarcity of 
certain type of shares (Eun & Janakiramanan 1986; Stulz & Wasserfallen 1995), 
differential risk perception of investors (Errunza & Losq 1985; Hietala 1989), information 
asymmetry (Bailey & Jagtiani 1994; Chan, Menkveld & Yanh 2008) and distinct market 
sentiments (Bodurtha et al. 1995). Empirical studies around the world echoes those 
hypotheses to varying degrees.  
 
24 
 
 
Eun and Janakiramanan (1986) and Hietala (1989) consider the situation where restrictions 
are imposed not on the overall accessibility of foreigners to investing in local market but on 
the fraction of ownership of local companies owned by foreign investors, which is common 
among newly emerging economies in the 1980s and present in current China’s stock market. 
Eun and Janakiramanan (1986) argue that the pricing of foreign shares relative to domestic 
shares will alter depending on the binding nature of the percentage constraint. When the 
constraint is binding and thus the demand of these shares by foreigner exceeds the supply, 
foreigners would like to pay a price higher than what they would have paid without such 
restrictions. Likewise, when the demand of domestic investors is less than the supply, the 
securities will be sold at a discount among domestic investors. An important implication to 
the present study is that the relaxation of foreign ownership restrictions should be followed 
by a decrease in premium given by foreign investors as well as a decrease in discount 
requested by domestic investors, thus narrowing the pricing gap.  
 
Hietala (1989) consider a slightly different case in which a restriction posed on domestic 
investors to invest overseas is also accounted for while at the same time foreign investors 
still face the percentage ownership constraint in local markets. This setting is based on the 
regulations in Finnish stock market in the 1980s and also resembles to the largest extent the 
current Chinese stock market. With a model consisting of two types of investors- domestic 
and foreign, and three kinds of shares- local shares restricted to domestic investors, local 
shares available to both types of investors, and foreign shares available only to foreign 
investors, he shows that each type of investors values every type of these shares differently. 
However, since the first and third kinds of shares are only available to respective investors, 
contradiction of pricing exists only on the second kind of shares, namely the unrestricted 
shares traded in local markets. The equilibrium market price for these shares hinges on the 
demand of the investor group for which the required risk premium is lower (valuation 
higher) and thus the stocks are overpriced from the viewpoint of the other investor group. 
Moreover, because there exists regulations against short selling for any type of investors, 
the seemingly overvaluation will not be adjusted to reflect the valuation of another group of 
investors. This result implies that if the short selling ban is removed from such a setting, a 
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universal price of unrestricted shares in local market should be observed even though the 
markets of two groups of investors are still segmented.  
 
Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995) consider a possibility of voluntary restriction adopted by 
enterprises rather than that prescribed by the government. In the same spirit with Eun and 
Janakiramanan (1986), they argue that the demand from foreign investors is less price 
elastic than the demand from domestic investors due to deadweight cost. As a result, the 
domestic entrepreneurs like to pose a limit on foreign ownership so as to maximize firm 
values through price discrimination against foreign investors. Their study has the same 
empirical implication as Eun and Janakiramanan (1986) in that the cross-sectional premium 
of unrestricted shares will be negatively related with the supply of shares available to 
foreign investors. They test this hypothesis using unique data from Switzerland and 
document that an increase in the supply of unrestricted shares associated with the relaxation 
of restrictions decreases the price of unrestricted shares, driving the prices of two series of 
shares together. 
 
Bodurtha et al. (1995) expand the investor sentiment framework established by Lee, 
Shleifer & Thaler (1991) in their investigation of closed-end fund puzzle to the study of 
closed-end country fund premiums and argue that the premium captures the differential 
sentiment between the U.S. and the country where the underlying shares stem. They 
provide evidence by documenting the comovement of the fund premiums with the U.S. 
market. Additionally, consistent with the finding of Bonser-Neal et al. (1990), they also 
provide evidence to the relative supply hypothesis by showing that fund premiums tend to 
be higher and more volatile for countries with more restrictive foreign ownership policies. 
However, in countries without such restrictions, they find that the country-specific risk is 
still evident.  
 
There are also considerations from the perspective of information asymmetry in explaining  
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the cross-sectional variation of price premiums. Bailey and Jagtiani (1994) argue that it is 
easier for foreign investors to acquire information about large firms than about small firms, 
and that foreign investors are therefore willing to pay a higher premium to invest in large 
firms. They prove this hypothesis on the Thai stock market.  
 
Empirically, Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (1997) lend evidence from the Mexican stock 
market and confirm the explanatory power of relative share supply and firm size in the 
cross-sectional variation of unrestricted share premiums in Mexico. In a comprehensive 
examination, Bailey, Chung and Kang (1999) test various hypotheses using stock price data 
from 11 countries with percentage ownership restrictions in the period of 1988-1996 and 
find that premiums of unrestricted shares are positively correlated with (1) demand of 
foreign investors measured by international mutual fund flows, (2) market sentiment 
inherent in closed-end country fund premiums, (3) market liquidity, and (4) information 
transparency reflected in the number of press coverage, country credit rating and firm size.  
 
Bailey (1994) is the first to exclusively look at the Chinese stock market in order to uncover 
the foreign share discount puzzle, even though the analysis is only based on limited 
observations both in time-series dimension and cross-sectionally. He attributes the 
premiums received by domestic investors to the lack of alternative investment channels and 
unattractive bank interest rates that push the required rate of equity return below the level 
that foreigner investors would accept.  Using a longer time frame, Fernald and Rogers 
(2002) arrive at similar conclusions that domestic investors’ lack of alternative investment 
opportunities plays a major role in the observed lower return required by Chinese investors 
than that required by foreign investors. Furthermore, they explore the cross-sectional 
variation of discounts and find that foreigners pay a lower price, giving rise to a larger gap, 
for companies with higher national ownership.  
 
Mei, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) argue that there is a non-fundamental component in 
domestic A-share prices and that speculative trading of local investors is responsible for the 
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higher price of A-shares. Using a panel data approach, they confirm their analysis by 
showing that the turnover rate of A-shares can explain away 20% of the cross-sectional 
variation in premium of A-shares over B-shares. The finding regarding the decisive trading 
activity in domestic A-share market is also confirmed in Bailey, Chuang, and Kang (1999) 
in their cross-country analysis and highlighted in a sub-section dealing particularly with the 
Chinese discount with a sample of four Chinese companies. Wang and Jiang (2004) provide 
evidence for the market sentiment hypothesis and document that H-shares exhibit 
significant exposure to Hong Kong market factors and behave more like Hong Kong stocks 
than like Chinese stocks even though they are issued by Chinese companies with business 
based in China. Chan and Kwok (2005) confirm the relative supply hypothesis after 
highlighting the reverse setting in Chinese stock market in which A-shares are relatively 
scarce than unrestricted shares in the form of both B-shares and foreign-listed H-shares. 
They show that cross-sectional variation in the premium of A-shares is negatively related to 
the relative supply of A-shares and positively related to the relative supply of foreign shares 
(lower supply of foreign shares results in higher valuation for these companies, thus 
lowering premium of A-shares over the foreign shares for these companies).   
 
Insufficient supply of A-shares, coupled with excessive demand from domestic investors 
due to the lack of alternatives, result in a higher turnover and speculative behavior, pushing 
up the price of A- shares. The theories provided in aforementioned studies seem to be 
interrelated in a larger picture. However, other hypotheses outside the supply and demand 
framework are also put forward and prove to be strongly explanatory. For example, Chan, 
Menkveld, and Yanh (2008) expand the information asymmetry hypothesis by constructing 
their two more proxies other than the usual size of firm and use them to examine the price 
difference of Chinese A-B- shares. They find that two proxies- price impact measure and 
adverse selection component of bid-ask spread- explain respectively 44% and 46% of the 
cross-sectional variation in B-share discounts. 
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A major event in China’s B-share market is captured in a variety of studies as a “(partial) 
resolution” of the Chinese discount puzzle. In 2001, China’s security authority allowed 
domestic investors with required foreign currencies to invest in the B-share market that is 
previously restricted to foreign investors. It is observed that this change of regulation 
resulted in a dramatic decline of B-share discount from 75% to 8% on average (Karolyi, Li 
& Liao 2009). Using a cross-sectional quasi event study regression, Karolyi, Li and Liao 
(2009) find that small cap companies and companies with positive past-return momentum 
are mostly concentrated by domestic investors in bidding up the price of B-shares (largest 
price changes). Alternative variables such as differential risk exposure (local market beta of 
A-shares and world market beta of B-shares), liquidity and trading volume lose explanatory 
power in modeling the extent of price changes around the event.  
 
In conclusion, in this part a few alternative hypotheses proposed and tested seeking to 
explain the discount of foreign shares in Chinese stock market as opposite to common 
premiums witnessed among countries with similar segmented settings are reviewed and 
evaluated. Among them many are proved to be significant in either cross-sectional or time 
series analysis of the price difference. Furthermore, the foreign discount in Chinese stock 
market is found to be not inconsistent with mainstream hypotheses proposed to model the 
common foreign premiums. At last, we see that arbitrage behaviors by domestic investors 
in the B-share market solve the unequal pricing problem to a large extent, although it is 
done by bidding up the price of B-shares rather than correcting the commonly perceived 
over-valuation associated with A- shares.  In the following part, the role of arbitrage in 
driving prices of identical assets together and the cost or limit of arbitrage associated with 
large pricing differences during sustained period of time are discussed in more detail.  
 
3.2. Direct Barriers to Arbitrage 
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Regardless of premiums witnessed in other markets or discounts observed in Chinese stock 
market, and whatever the sources that drive away the prices of identical assets in the first 
place, since the assets traded in different markets are identical after all, we would expect 
the relative mispricing to disappear and the two series of price to converge or become 
substantially close to each other whenever arbitrage is possible.  
 
Traditional arbitrage behavior involves buying the relatively undervalued and selling the 
relatively overvalued at the same time. Impediments to this kind of arbitrage activity can 
take many forms, two of which that are more evident and of more concern in our study are 
inaccessibility of markets and short selling restrictions in either market. These are the direct 
barriers that deter any potential arbitrageurs from correcting the relative mispricing. The 
persistence of pricing difference in the case of restricted/unrestricted shares is 
comparatively understandable in this regard since trading can take place within groups of 
investors but not among groups. This is generally prescribed by regulators posing such 
investment restrictions right from the formation of the markets designated to different 
groups of investors.  Since supply cannot be shared and demand differs, there is no wonder 
any relative mispricing resulted from different condition of supply and demand will sustain. 
The deregulation of Chinese B-share market discussed in Karolyi, Li and Liao (2009) 
provides a good example of what would happen when one group of investor is granted 
access to the market previously dominated by another group of investors. The problem of 
different valuations is immediately solved by the more optimistic investors taking over the 
market.  
 
The situation is the same in the case of closed-end country funds when the countries where 
underlying shares come from have foreign investment controls in effect on local markets. In 
investigating the effect of investment barriers on the pricing of closed-end country funds, 
Bonser-Neal et al. (1990) argue that, consistent with the relative supply hypothesis 
proposed by Eun and Janakiramanan (1986), binding restrictions on cross-border 
investment will raise the price of a fund relative to its net asset value (NAV) by 
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approximately the amount the marginal foreign investor is willing to pay to avoid these 
restriction. Through regression analysis they establish a relation between announcements of 
changes in foreign investment restrictions and changes in country fund premiums in France, 
Japan, Korea and Mexico. Bodurtha, Kim and Lee (1995) also show that premiums of 
closed-end country fund tend to be higher and more volatile for countries with more 
restrictive foreign ownership policies, proving the bonding effect of direct barriers to 
arbitrage.  
 
Another evident barrier of arbitrage is restrictions on short selling in either of the markets 
concerned. In Hietala (1989)’s model of three markets and two kinds of investors, both 
domestic and foreign investors have access to the second market. He argues that the final 
price level in that market is determined by the group of investors with lower required rate 
of return, thus higher valuation. Since short selling is precluded, the other group of 
investors with more moderate opinion cannot correct the valuation to reflect their views. 
When the pricing level of the second market is compared with that of first and third market, 
the groups of investors who cherish the bullish opinion and who are more bearish is clear. 
Actually, even in one domestic market, there may exist distinct kinds of investors with 
polar-different perceptions, leading to varying valuation of identical assets. This is the view 
held by many researchers arguing against the restrictions on short sales.  For example,  
Miller (1977) theorize that when short sales constraint is in effect, asset prices tend to 
reflect a more optimistic valuation than the average opinion held among potential investors. 
Similarly, Figlewski (1981) show that when short selling restrictions are bonding that 
effectively prevent informed investors with unfavorable information from selling short, 
excess demand exists that result in a higher equilibrium price than in the case when short 
selling is allowed.  
 
Empirically, Jones and Lamont (2002) use data in U.S. during 1926-1933 when a central 
stock lending market exists and the loaning data is readily available and find that stocks 
that are costly to short have higher valuations and low subsequent returns. More recently, 
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use information regarding short selling regulation from 46 stock markets around the world, 
Bris et al (2007) provide weak evidence that short selling facilitates efficient price 
discovery. Furthermore, they document that lifting of short sale restrictions is associated 
with increased negative skewness in market returns. However, they find that enabling short 
selling has no significant impact on the frequency of large declines in price, suggesting that 
short selling activities are responsible for more negative returns buy not larger negative 
returns.  
 
Chang, Cheng, and Yu (2007) adopt an event study approach and examine the “inclusion” 
effect of stocks added to the list of designated stocks eligible for short established and 
revised periodically by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. They find that short sale 
constraints tend to cause stock overvaluation and that the overvaluation effect is more 
dramatic for individual stocks with wider dispersion of opinions measured by volatility of 
daily stock returns. They also document higher volatility and less positive skewness of 
individual stocks after allowed for selling short.  
 
Relative overvaluation of stocks may be better identified through examination of pricing of 
identical shares in two markets, one with short selling restrictions and one without. 
However, sample of real cases may be difficult to find and test. Foreign-listed emerging 
countries shares are good candidates but those cross-listed shares, mostly in the form of 
ADRs in the U.S., are generally observed to be traded at parity with underlying ones due to 
the fungibility of ADRs inherent in the program itself (Gagnon & Karolyi 2010).  The large 
sample of firms focused in this study that list their shares both in Chinese stock market with 
short selling restriction and Hong Kong stock market with relatively fewer constraints 
provides an ideal vehicle to perform such a test. 
 
3.3. Indirect Barriers to Arbitrage 
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Even in the absence of those direct barriers, arbitrage can still turn out to be costly, difficult, 
or associated with substantial risks, as opposite to the commonly perceived “risk-free” 
arbitrage.  These kinds of barriers to arbitrage can be regarded as indirect barriers. In 
investigation of the domestic closed-end fund discount, Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) 
point out the difficulty involved in arbitrage strategies aiming at eliminating those pricing 
differences. First, the exact replication of the portfolio may be difficult due to frequent 
changes of component stocks and comparatively infrequent disclosure (quarterly or 
semiannually). Second, investors’ cost may not be covered since holding the portfolio can 
only obtain a portion of dividends while shorting needs to pay out the full amount of 
dividends. This, added by Pontiff (1996) that the (saving) interest received from shorting 
the stocks may be much less than that (borrowing) paid out in a long position realized by 
margin trading, makes potential profits to shrink due to additional cost associated with 
short sales. Third, which is studied in more detail in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) as well as 
Kondor (2009), is the uncertainty involved in eliminating the relative mispricing, such as 
noise trader risk that drive prices further away from their fundamental values in sustained 
period of time and the resulting infinite horizon needed to correct the pricing.  
 
While the first consideration is unique to closed-end funds, the last two limitations are 
common to all situations including the relative mispricing of cross-listed shares. Moreover, 
unlike the direct barriers to arbitrage that are bonding to all securities in a market, the 
extent of indirect barriers may vary across firms. So it is rational to hypothesize that the 
extent of mispricing is correlated with varying cost of arbitrage across firms. This is 
hypothesis is explicitly tested in, among others, Pontiff (1996) and Gemmill and Thomas 
(2002) with cross-sectional models. Even though Bodurtha, Kim and Lee (1995) do not 
perform such an analysis, they confirm this view by showing that country funds have larger 
premiums and discounts than domestic closed-end funds, mainly due to increased cost 
associated with international arbitrage and greater uncertainty.  
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Using absolute value instead of the real value of the discount or premium as the dependent 
variable, Pontiff (1996) show that the market value and NAV are more likely to diverge, in 
the form of either a premium or a discount, for funds (1) with underlying portfolios that are 
hard to replicate, (2) that pay out smaller dividends, (3) with lower market value, and (4) 
for all funds when interest rates are high.  Taking particular interest in the noise trader risk 
implied by Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991), Gemmill and Thomas (2002) model the 
discounts of closed-end funds from U.K. and control for other factors such as size and 
dividend yield used in Pontiff (1996). While they document that in time-series dimension 
noise trader sentiment, as proxied by retail investor flows, results in fluctuations in the 
discount, they find mixed evidence regarding the cross-sectional explanatory power of 
noise trader risk. The rest of their results are largely consistent with the findings of Pontiff 
(1996). For example, age and size of the fund are proved to be significant in explaining the 
discount with age of funds positively correlated with discount and market value of the 
underlying portfolio negatively associated, meaning that newer and larger funds have less 
severe pricing discrepancies. Dividend yield and transaction cost variable have inconsistent 
results of significance test in models with or without the noise trader risk proxy but the 
signs are in line with predictions.  
 
To sum up, in this part we explore the reasons why pricing difference of identical assets 
traded in different markets are not eliminated in disregard the sources contributing to them 
in the first place. Specifically, various barriers of arbitrage are discussed and studies 
concerning their impact are briefly reviewed. Generally, whatever the reason that gives rise 
to the pricing difference, the lack of arbitrage mechanism in some markets and costly 
arbitrage in others enables them to persist. In the following section we test the effect of 
both direct and indirect barriers suggested in literature on the time-varying and cross-
sectional fluctuation of price difference using our sample of cross-listed shares.  
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4. SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
The sample used in this study is initially formed based on Hang Seng China A-H Premium 
Index which is published in 2006 by Hang Seng Index Corporation and contains the largest 
53 cross-listed companies in terms of their market capitalization in Hong Kong stock 
market. This index is revised by leaving out 5 companies whose H-shares are either 
relatively illiquid (less frequent volume data) or traded less than 1 Hong Kong Dollar 
($0.13USD) on average. It leaves us with 47 companies that list shares in both markets. The 
list of 47 companies in our sample and their tickers in two markets are provided in the 
Appendix.  
 
The tracking history is also extended back to the year of 2000. Thus, for those cross listings 
conducted before 2000 the sample starts from 2000, and for those companies that cross-list 
their shares after 2000, the sample starts from the first trading day of the cross listing for 
that particular company. As a tradition, a large portion of companies first lists their stocks 
in Hong Kong and then go back to China as the stock markets develop.  
 
Data used in this study come from multiple sources. Data of stock prices and trading 
volume are obtained from Yahoo Finance. Company-specific information and financial 
data are gathered from several sources including Bloomberg, CNINFO, and company 
annual reports. Our data concerning the stock holding history of foreign institutional 
investors and short selling activity are mainly obtained from Shenzhen Genius Finance, a 
whole subsidiary of China Finance Online, and cross-checked in areas of confusion with a 
variety of Chinese finance websites including JRJ, Hexun Stock and Sohu Stock  that 
provide sporadic or partial information on these issues.  Table 5 presents a summary of 
some time-invariant characteristics of the sample companies. All information is updated till 
the end of 2012.  
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Table 5. Characteristics of sample companies 
This table reviews a number of time-invariant of characteristics of the sample companies, including industry, 
place of Initial Public Offering (IPO), time of IPO, whether shares in China are listed on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SHSE) or Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), and the number of companies in the sample that are 
constituent stocks of major indexes in two markets. Particularly, SSE 50 and SSE 180 are two major indexes 
of SHSE and cover the largest and most liquid 50 and 180 stocks on SHSE respectively. CSI 300 covers the 
largest and most liquid 300 stocks listed either on SHSE or SZSE. Hang Seng Index is the barometer of Hong 
Kong stock market and includes the largest 50 stocks listed on HKSE.  All information is updated till the end 
of 2012. 
Total: 47 companies 
Industry IPO venue IPO year 
Basic Materials 6 
1 
 
 
Hong Kong 37 
2 
 
 
1993-1996 11 
17 Communications China 1997-2000 
Consumer 9  Simultaneously 
(within 1 month) 
 
8 
 
 
2001-2005 13 
Energy 6  2006-2012 6 
Financial 9     
Industrial 12  
Utilities 3  
Domestic Listing Venue  
 
Index Constitution - China  
 
Index Constitution - HK 
Shanghai 44 
  3 
SSE 50 14 
27 
Hang Seng Index 11 
Shenzhen SSE 180  
   CSI 300       30    
 
 
As can be seen from the table, the vast majority of companies in our sample first list their 
shares in HKSE and a large portion of companies do so in the five years after the handover 
of sovereign right in 1997. The common behavior of Chinese firms’ going public in Hong 
Kong is consistent with the investor recognition and bonding hypothesis proposed by 
literature. The initial public offering of many national firms is part of the governments’ 
reform to privatize its enterprises in the early 1990s. Since domestic stock exchanges were 
merely open at that time, HKSE seemed to be the best choice to bring home large 
companies to the international stage and learn from experiences of advanced exchanges at 
the same time. While many other firms choose to list in more remote stock exchanges like 
NYSE and LSE, HKSE was the most popular overseas listing venue probably due to its 
proximity both in geography and in language and culture. Some of them cross-list in one of 
the domestic exchanges one year or so apart; the others do so in later years, especially in 
the 2000s when domestic stock markets grow and evolve.   
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About 29% and 23% of the sample companies are included in the largest cap index in 
domestic and Hong Kong stock market respectively. Moreover, over half of the sample 
companies are components of SSE180 Index which captures the largest and most liquid 
stocks in domestic A-share markets. These stocks are also among the first portion of stocks 
that are allowed by the authority to be eligible for short selling activity.  
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5. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
5.1. Direct Barriers and Time-Varying Price Differences 
  
5.1.1. Time-Varying Price Difference 
 
As a first step, it is helpful to sketch the size of the phenomenon we will study. Equal 
weighted average prices for both A- and H- shares are compiled to observe the price 
differential collectively along the time. Figure 1 shows the price behavior of two portfolios 
during the whole sample period from January 2000 to December 2012.  Also plotted is 
China’s GDP growth rate on a quarterly basis.  
 
 
   Figure 1. A- H- share prices of cross-listed companies 
This figure shows index level time-varying pricing discrepancy of two share series. Equal-weighted 
average prices for both A- and H-shares are calculated on a weekly basis from January 2000 to December 
2012. Also plotted is China’s GDP growth rate measured on a quarterly basis.  
 
It can be seen from the graph that during the sample period from 2000 to 2012, prices of A- 
and H-shares largely move together. The general trends are almost the same and are 
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consistent with the growth of the country’s economy as a whole. It is noticeable that every 
time the GDP growth rate of China peak in the neighborhood, so does the price of both A- 
and H- shares. The huge expansion of China’s stock market in 2007 is not groundless in 
hindsight since it coincides with the greatest momentum on the growth of the economy. 
Furthermore, the general uptrend staring from the beginning of 2009 is in line with the new 
round of fiscal policy implemented by the Chinese government to mitigate the impact of 
global financial crisis and boost domestic economy. The general co-movement of two 
series of shares implies that they are largely sensitive to the same series of factors. After all 
they are issued by the same Chinese company that bases its business in China.  
 
Three periods of large deviation from law of one price can be identified: the years before 
2005, the 2007 China’s stock market surge, and the upper half of 2009. However, in the 
period before the year of 2005, H-shares are constantly increasing in price, shrinking the 
gap with A-share prices. This can be attributed to, and verified in later part of the study, the 
gradual loosening of capital control in China’s stock market. The second large deviation 
happens during the market expansion of 2007 when Shanghai stock market is ranked as one 
of the best performers in the world. The price of A- and H-shares diverges drastically in 
this period with A-shares showing greater momentum. The third occasion in the upper part 
of 2009 is probably resulted from the implementation of powerful fiscal policy in mainland 
China to boost economy, which may raise investor confidence in a more significant way 
than in Hong Kong.  
 
5.1.2. Model Specification 
 
In this part, the effect of two reforms in China’s stock market on the aggregate pricing 
difference in two markets is formally tested. Bonser-Neal et al. (1990) use an event study to 
examine the announcement effect of relaxation on investment restrictions on the premium 
of country funds relative to their NAVs. In the same spirit, we adopt a quasi-event study 
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approach and estimate the following model to examine the effect of loosening two direct 
barriers discussed in our study on the pricing difference of cross-listed shares.  
 
                                                          
 
        
 
where       is the log difference of prices for cross-listed shares at time t, averaged across 
sample companies, namely,                                ;      are dummy 
variables representing different stages of relevant reforms.   
 
5.1.3. Relaxation of Direct Barriers 
 
As reviewed in the second section, the process of loosening capital inflow in Chinese stock 
market can been divided into five periods based on changes of the amount of quota 
approved under QFII program for foreign investment (see Table 3). Thus, four dummy 
variables are used to isolate each period as illustrated in Panel A of Figure 2.  
 
Similarly, the removal of restrictions on short sales can be regarded as a two-step process 
with the first step serving as a pilot program by allowing the largest 50 stocks in the market 
to be sold short. The following enlargement of the scope includes the constituent stocks of 
SSE 180 Index (see Table 4). Accordingly the whole sample period can be divided into 
three periods and two dummies are used to account for increasing intensity of the reform. 
Panel B of Figure 2 shows this process. 
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Panel A: Relaxation on foreign investment restriction 
 
Panel B: Removal of short selling restriction
 
Figure 2. Timetable for relaxation of direct barriers 
This figure fits multi-stages of respective reforms that remove or reduce direct barriers to arbitrage into a 
quasi-event study regression model with n dummy variables representing n+1different stages in each case.  
The separation of stages is based on details shown in Table 3 and Table 4.  
 
Thus model (1) can be further specified based on stages of respective reforms as follow: 
 
(2)                                                                   
(3)                                                             
 
Regressions are estimated using OLS and the Newey-West (1987) correction for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Murray (2005) suggest that, with quaterly data, if 
any shock will dissipate within two years, at least a lag of 8 should be accounted. 
Accordingly, with weekly data, a maximum lag of 52 week is considered given the 
observation in the previous part that it normally takes one year or so for prices of two series 
to converge again. Smaller order of auto-correlation only makes the t-statistics more 
significant.  
 
The results are shown in Table 6. The estimates in Panel A are consistent with the finding 
of Bonser-Neal et al. (1990) regarding closed-end country funds that loosing capital control 
Before  
Dec.2002 
Dec.2002 - 
Jun.2005 
(QFII1) 
Jul.2005 - 
Nov.2007 
(QFII2) 
Dec.2007 - 
Apr.2012 
(QFII3) 
After 
Apr.2012 
(QFII4) 
    Before Mar.2010   
Apr.2010 - Nov.2011 
(Short1) 
After Dec.2011 
(Short2) 
41 
 
 
Table 6. Impact of direct barriers on prices of cross-listed shares 
The table reports the result from regressions of the two time-series models: 
                                                 
                              
where       is the log price difference of two share series at time t, averaged across sample companies; 
      
 
    are dummy variables representing four different stages of the QFII program and one period 
before introduction of the program;        
 
    represent two stages inherent in the removal of short-
sales restriction and one period  when such restriction is in effect. Estimates are controlled for 
heterskedasticity and auto-correlation using Newey-West (1987) standard error with 52 lags. ** 
represents significance at 5% level.  
 
  Intercept             R-Squared 
Panel A: Relaxation on foreign investment restriction 
 1.57 
(9.13)** 
-0.88 
(-3.87)** 
-1.37 
(-7.56)** 
-1.41 
(-7.81)** 
-1.57 
(-9.01)** 
86.38% 
Panel B: Removal of short selling restriction 
 0.68 
(3.65)** 
-0.64 
(-3.46)** 
-0.68 
(-3.63)** 
  18.58% 
 
reduces the pricing difference of the fund and its underlying portfolio. The intercept stands 
for the period when no foreign investments are allowed in China’s A-share market and 
shows that A-shares are on average traded at a premium than their H-share counterparts. 
The increase in magnitude of the negative coefficient of QFII dummies demonstrates that 
the price discrepancy of shares cross-listed in Hong Kong and China decreases with the 
quota of foreign investment under QFII program in Chinese stock market. The model 
explains away more than 80 percent of the time varying difference of prices of A-H-shares.  
 
Panel B demonstrates the impact of loosening short selling restrictions on the price gap 
between A-H- shares. The results response to Mei, Scheinkman & Xiong (2003)’ argument 
about overvalued A-shares and speculation behavior in the A-share market that approval of 
short selling activity reduces the priced difference of two series of shares. In more general 
way, short sales are indispensable in efficient pricing function of a market and inherent in 
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most asset pricing models, thus fewer artificial restrictions of this kind would improve the 
pricing efficiency of market concerned, reducing pricing discrepancies when compared 
with a more advanced market. 
 
5.2. Indirect Barriers and Cross-Sectional Variation of Price Differences 
  
In this part the cross-sectional variation of pricing differences among firms is focused and 
the relation between the variation and various direct and indirect barriers to arbitrage 
proposed in literature is explored.  
 
5.2.1. Variations in Difference across Companies 
 
Although relaxation of direct barriers to arbitrage gradually and significantly reduce the 
pricing difference in two markets along the time, from a company level the average level of 
difference and the speed of convergence given certain shocks differs a lot. Figure 3 gives a 
comparison between three cross-listed firms in our sample.  
 
Three companies in Figure 3 represent three main types of price behavior of cross-listed 
shares in the sample. The first one shows that shares in Hong Kong stock market were 
traded at discount until the last three years staring from the beginning of 2010 when H-
share prices rise above that of A-shares in China’s market. The second one gives an 
example of a company with a higher-valued H-share price all along the time during which 
the company is cross-listed on two exchanges, even though the premium of H-shares over 
A-shares varies through time and closes to zero in many occasions. The third one represent 
a complete opposite case in which A-shares prices are always higher that their H-share 
counterparts in the cross-listing history of the company.  
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Figure 3. Variation in difference across firms 
This figure provides three typical examples of price behavior of cross-listed A-and H-shares in the 
sample in their respective cross-listing history. The fist one represents the vast majority of sample 
companies for which A-shares were traded at a higher price than H-shares until the situation was 
reversed during the past few years. The second one is representative on the company that enjoys a higher 
H-share price ever since the cross-listing. The final one shows the opposite case.  
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Due to the large discrepancy among firms and in order to unveil more patterns across firms 
in their price behavior of cross-listed shares, we screen through the dates when the shares 
are cross-listing and note down the first cross-over time of the prices of two share series for 
each company. It is found that among 47 sample companies, there are 35 companies whose 
A- H- share prices have crossed at least once since the cross-listing and as of the end of 
2012. The cross-over days clustered around the middle of 2006, 2008 and 2012, similar to 
the finding of aggregate time-series analysis in the previous section. To the rest 12 
companies whose two share prices never crossed, 5 of them have had a difference of less 
than 10% in history (it’s already close given the general large difference in China’s case). 
For the remaining 7 pairs, the pricing differential narrowed sometime in the cross-listing 
history but had never gotten that close, let alone cross over. For them, the H-shares in Hong 
Kong are always traded at a discount over A-shares in China. We notice that there is at least 
one quality shared by those uncrossed shares: they are either very cheap (H-share price is 
less than 2 HK Dollar or $0.26 USD), or their prices were declining monotonously over the 
sample period.  
 
A few other patterns also come to attention. First, there is a collective “coming home” for 
China’s national banks and some other large-cap corporations from Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange to Shanghai Stock Exchange during 2006-2008. They were initially listed in 
HKSE in the early 2000s and cross-listed in SHSE following the expansion of domestic 
stock markets. The two series of prices intersected, normally within one year, after they 
were cross-listed in home stock exchanges. Second, there are a few companies which 
performed their IPOs in both markets at the same time after 2005, normally a few dates 
apart. Their issuing prices differed slightly but converged shortly, and never drifted apart 
very far.  
 
In order to formally investigate the role of various indirect barriers to arbitrage in the cross-
section variation of price difference among firms, a number of indirect barriers suggested in 
literature and their proxies in the context of cross-listed shares are discussed. Factors 
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regarding trading activity and firm characteristics are also considered to control for their 
potential effect.   
 
5.2.2. Proxies for Indirect Barriers and Control Variables 
 
The two direct barriers discussed in previous part also have their implications in the cross-
sectional analysis since the removal of short selling bans and investment by foreign 
institutions do not affect all companies in the sample. With the unique dataset, those 
companies that have real short selling transaction history as well as those actually invested 
by foreign institutions can be identified. This matters since the list of shortable shares 
published by China’s security authority may differ from the shares that actually have a 
lending market in the early stage of development. Therefore, two dummies for direct 
barriers are both evaluated based on real transaction data. Three indirect barriers 
investigated and discussed in more detail in what follows are noise trader risk, volatility of 
price differences and concentration of ownership.  
 
A. Noise trader risk 
 
Delong et al. (1990) consider the market as a contest between rational arbitrageurs and 
sentiment-driven noise traders. They argue that arbitrageurs are likely to be risk averse and 
to have short horizons so that the willingness to take positions against noise trader is 
limited. Lee, Shleifer & Thaler (1991) derive an implication from the study of Delong et al. 
(1990) that forms the theoretical framework of their study of closed-end fund discounts. 
They claim that levels of and changes in discounts should be highly correlated across funds. 
This is due to the observation that closed-end funds are largely held by individual investors 
who, according to them, form the base of noise traders. Thus, fluctuation of closed-end 
fund discount should reflect changes in individual investor sentiment which is also present 
in small capitalization stocks. They confirm their argument by documenting that the 
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discounts on closed-end funds narrow when small stocks do well, suggesting that the 
discounts are smaller when individual investors’ sentiment is high.   
 
Parallel with previous studies in term of time-series observations, Gemmill and Thosmas 
(2002) provide further support by theorizing that the existence of a discount is a rational 
phenomenon in closed-end funds and by showing that noise-trader sentiment, as proxied by 
retail-investor flows, leads to time-series fluctuations in the discount. As a matter of fact, 
the time-varying discounts of closed-end fund prices are often cited as proxy for retail 
investor sentiment (see e.g. Baker & Wurgler 2006).  
 
However, unlike the unanimous opinion obtained in time-series analysis, cross-company 
empirical studies have a hard time proving this idea. In a cross-sectional analysis with 
averaged observations over a long period, Gemmill and Thosmas (2002) reject the 
hypothesis that noise trader risk is a priced factor that causes the discount. They find that 
higher exposure to sentiment is associated with lower discount. Specifically, they use the 
individual fund sensitivity to the value-weighted average discount as a proxy for systematic 
sentiment factor and interpret that higher loading of sentiment factor reveals higher noise 
trader risk so that if it is a systematic risk priced in the discount, higher beta should result in 
a higher discount. The empirical result of a negative sign to this factor found in their 
regression model therefore rejects the hypothesis and renders the noise trader risk a puzzle.  
 
This discrepancy may result from their measure of noise trader risk and interpretation of the 
result. As a matter of consistency, in the paper this measure continues to serve as the proxy 
for noise trader risk.  In the context of cross-listed shares it is calculated as follows:  
 
(4)                                           (i=1, 2, … 47) 
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where         is the log price difference between A- and H-shares in time t for company i; 
             is the mean price difference in time t averaged across 47 sample companies. For each 
company the regression is run over the sub-sample period during April 2010-December 
2012 and the beta obtained from the regression is thus the proxy for systematic noise factor 
to be used in later cross-section analysis. In other words, the noise trader risk is measured 
by the individual share sensitivity to the averaged share difference across sample firms.  
 
The interpretation of this variable needs some caution. Theoretically, as suggested in Lee, 
Shleifer & Thaler (1991), greater exposure to this priced risk factor, which is captured by a 
larger beta, should be followed with larger pricing differences since idiosyncratic risks can 
be diversified away and thus are not counted. This points to a positive sign of this variable 
in a cross-sectional analysis. However, in our context of internationally cross-listed shares, 
a negative sigh with regard to the beta is expected. Here are the reasons. First, two series of 
shares in our sample are listed and traded in two different stock markets, thus may reflect 
market- or country-related sentiment as described in Bodurtha et al. (1995). A fluctuation 
more correlated with average changes can be interpreted as ease of arbitrage if hedging of 
arbitrage position is considered. On the contrary, lower association with the average level 
may indicate that the companies’ shares incorporate the sentiments of two markets 
differently than other pairs and further suggest unobservable artificial manipulation of 
prices in either market. Second, we argue that in the real world, contrary to textbook 
predictions, idiosyncratic risks associated with arbitrageurs’ positions matter more than 
systematic risks. This is due to the consideration that arbitrage activities between two 
markets are more complex and involves more risks than simple portfolio investment. 
Multiple short and long positions are required so that it is normally not possible to take 
enough arbitrage position so as to diversify away idiosyncratic risks.  
 
Indeed, the argument expounded here that hedging outweighs diversification can find its 
origin in a variety of theoretical studies. In their study of agency problems of professional 
arbitrageurs, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out that “To specialized arbitrageurs, both 
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systematic and idiosyncratic risk matters. In fact, idiosyncratic volatility probably matters 
more, since it cannot be hedged and arbitrageurs are not diversified. ” They continue saying 
that “In reality, arbitrage resources are heavily concentrated in hands of few investors that 
are highly specialized in trading a few assets, and are far from diversified. As a result, these 
investors care about total risk, and not just systematic risk.” Following them, the 
importance of idiosyncratic risks in arbitrageurs’ position has been strengthened in some 
other studies addressing the relation between costly arbitrage and well-established market 
anomalies, such as index addition effect (Wurgler & Zhuravskaya 2002), book-to-market 
ratios (Ali et al. 2003), post-earnings announcement drift (Mendenhall 2004) and accrual 
and asset growth anomalies (Li & Sullivan 2010). However, despite the widespread 
acknowledgement, they fail to examine, due to the lack of generosity of the sample and the 
uniqueness of the anomaly they address, the extent to which idiosyncratic risks prevents 
arbitrageurs from forcing the price to theoretical values.  
 
In fact, without extract implication to the ease of arbitrage, the importance of idiosyncratic 
risk has been highlighted in a world of segmented market and costly information, prevailing 
in the 1980s before emerging economies began to liberalize their markets. With particular 
emphasis on segmented markets, Merton (1987) suggests that idiosyncratic risk raises 
expected returns when security markets are segmented and investors must incur a fixed cost 
to become informed and participate in each market. These assumptions fit the research 
question in this study of shares listed on both an open and well-established stock market 
and the relatively new and segmented China’s stock market.  
 
Due to the aforementioned reasons, the beta from model (4), which measures the systematic 
loading of this factor should has a negative impact on the price difference so that a smaller 
systematic factor indicates a larger idiosyncratic noise trader risk which, although can be 
diversified away theoretically, cannot be hedged easily in the real world. 
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B. Volatility of price differences 
 
Aside from the relatively controversial noise trader risk, two more proxies for indirect 
barriers to arbitrage are investigated. The first one is closely related to the noise trader risk. 
Pontiff (1996) posits that the risk of arbitrage position is the volatility of the difference 
between two related assets. If the volatility is low and the correlation between the returns 
on two series is high, then the arbitrageur is better hedged without being exposed to much 
fundamental risk. Thus, the volatility of price difference is another proxy for unhedged risk 
and the “out-of-range” risk discussed in Shleifer and Vishny (1997). They stress that the 
risk of further diverging from fundamental values associated with temporary mispriced 
assets can drive a performance-based arbitrageur out of money and thus results in the 
persistence of mispricing for these assets. As a result, the volatility of price difference 
should be positively related to the average price difference.  
 
Moreover, in Pontiff’s (1996) study of closed-end fund discounts, a measure for costly 
arbitrage is identified and strengthened in his later work trying to debunk the noise trader 
risk puzzle and auguring toward the deterministic role of idiosyncratic risk (see Pontiff 
2006). The proxy he uses for this variable is obtained at the following steps. First, model (4) 
is run for each sample fund and the residual is saved. Then annualized standard deviations 
of the residuals are calculated for each fund. The result, in his case of closed-end funds, is 
termed as log NAV residual standard deviation and used as the proxy for idiosyncratic risk. 
This differs from our measure whereas idiosyncratic risk is captured by the inverse relation 
with the systematic loading beta. When we use their measure as an alternative to ours, we 
find insignificant result. More interestingly, we document a near perfect correlation (ρ>0.9) 
of this variable to the second proxies of arbitrage barrier used in our study, the volatility of 
the price difference itself. However, it does not correlate much with our measure of 
idiosyncratic risk. As a result, by incorporating the volatility of price difference in our 
model, we are able to evaluate their measure to the same effect. Besides, this volatility is 
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also referred to, in Gemmill and Thosmas’s (2002) study of closed-end funds, as replication 
risks.  
 
C. Concentration of Ownership 
 
The extent of ownership concentration is measured by the percent of shares held by the ten 
largest shareholders in either China’s A-share market or foreign markets. The rational for 
this factor to deter arbitrage is straightforward. The more concentrated the shareholder base, 
the less likely for newly arbitrageurs to strike an impact on the price of shares. Thus the 
proxy for ownership concentration should be positively associated with the magnitude of 
relative mispricing.  
 
D.  Control Variables 
 
In order to isolate the impact of various barriers on the long-term price difference, we 
control for a number of factors, some of which are proved to be significant in predicting the 
relative mispricing in related empirical studies.  
 
 
i. Trading activity 
 
The first controlling factor is the volume ratio representing trading behavior in respective 
market. In a survey of literature regarding price-volume relation in financial markets, 
Karpoff (1987) conclude that volume is positively related to the magnitude of price change. 
In studying the role of trading volume in price momentum, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) 
show that past trading volume predicts both the magnitude and persistence of price 
momentrum. Dennis and Strickland (2002) document that there is abnormally high turnover 
associated with two percent share returns. Statman, Thorley & Vorkink (2006) relate 
turnover to investor overconfidence and find that share turnover is positively related to 
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lagged returns for many months. Trading and potential speculation also play an important 
role in the argument of Mei, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) trying to explain the price 
discount of foreign B-shares relative to A-shares. Therefore, we include the ratio of A-share 
trading volume over H-share volume averaged across the sample period in our model to 
control for this effect. Theoretically, a positive sign is expected since the more intense the 
trading in A-share market relative to H-share market, the more likely that A-shares are 
overvalued relative to their H-share counterparts.  
 
ii. Firm Attributes 
 
The second set of control variables are those related to various firm characteristics 
including size, performance, listing year in Hong Kong stock market and dividend paying 
history. Baker and Wurgler (2006) suggest that, other than the frequently cited small cap 
stocks, young stocks, unprofitable stocks, non-dividend paying stocks and extreme growth 
stocks are both more subject to subjective valuation and more costly to arbitrage. We want 
to see whether these attributes carry explanatory power for the cross-sectional variation of 
price difference in our sample of cross-listed shares. One potential contradiction lies in the 
sign of listing years, since it is observed in preliminary analysis that recently cross-listed 
firms have a smaller initial pricing difference and small range of disparity after the cross-
listing. Besides, in the case of closed-end funds, Gemmill and Thomas (2002) document a 
positive relation between the age of funds and the average discount of funds relative to their 
NAV, indicating that the older the fund the larger the pricing discrepancy. All variables 
analyzed in this part and their predicted effects on the pricing difference of cross-listed 
shares are summarized in Table 7.  
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Table 7. Measures of direct and indirect barriers to arbitrage 
This table summarizes all the variables discussed previously and used in following regression analysis, 
grouped according to variables representing direct and indirect barriers to arbitrage, variable controlling 
for trading activity and variables controlling for firm attributes.  The right hand side column indicates the 
sign of each variable’s predicted effect on price difference of A- and H- shares, based on the discussion 
above.    
Empirical Measure  Predicted effect on price differences 
Barriers to arbitrage  
      Direct barriers  
              Shortability in China’s stock market - 
              QFII investment - 
      Indirect barriers  
              Noise trader risk (Systematic noise factor)     + (-) 
              Volatility of price difference + 
              Concentration of ownership + 
  
Trading activity  
              Relative volume ratio between two markets + 
  
Firm characteristics  
              Size of firm - 
              Listing year on Hong Kong Stock Exchange / 
              Firm Performance - 
              Dividend - 
 
5.2.3. Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
 
Table 8 provides a summary of all continuous explanatory variables that are employed as 
independent variables in later cross-sectional regressions.  Since the latest removal of direct 
barrier, the relaxation of short selling activity, is not realized until March 2010, the data in 
this cross-sectional analysis starts from the first week of April 2010 and ends in the last 
week of year 2012. All weekly and yearly data are averaged over three years and by doing 
so we intend to explain price difference of cross-listed shares across firms in the long-run, 
rather than short-term variation.  
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics: cross-sectional regression 
This table presents descriptive statistics of dependent variables for the population of 47 cross-listed 
companies, averaged across the sub-sample period from April 2010 to December 2012.       and 
           are calculated using weekly data during the sub-sample period;      has a single value being 
the number of years listing on HKSE;          is first calculated on a weekly basis, then averaged 
across the sample period. The remaining variables,      ,           and    , are averaged from 
yearly observations. Panel A reports summary statistics; Panel B presents the correlation matrix.  
 
Panel A. Summary Statistics 
 
Numbers of 
Observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Proxies of Indirect Barriers 
      47 
47 
47 
1.064 
1.027 
0.806 
0.605 
0.392 
0.131 
0.342 
0.426 
4.034 
2.445            
      0.379 0.981 
Control Variables 
         47 
47 
47 
47 
2.093 
4.482 
13.127 
1.703 
2.193 
1.582 
4.739 
3.309 
0.102 
1.519 
5 
-11.64 
9.424 
8.159 
20 
6.28 
          
     
    
Panel B. Correlation Matrix of Variables  
                                                               
      1         
     0.09 1        
      0.29 0.12 1       
           0.05 0.04 0.51 1      
      0.12 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 1     
         -0.34 -0.09 -0.22 0.06 -0.58 1    
          0.53 0.17 0.21 -0.17 0.46 -0.62 1   
     -0.65 -0.11 -0.37 0.14 -0.16 0.45 -0.66 1  
    0.22 -0.04 -0.03 -0.29 0.08 -0.15 0.37 -0.23 1 
 
The first part of Panel A in Table 8 shows the statistics of the most concerned explanatory 
variables. The first variable,     , is the systematic noise factor calculated by regressing 
individual log difference on equal-weighted log difference of sample companies. The 
sample statistics show that the factor loading is averaged around one with a minimum of 
less than 0.5 and a maximum of more than 4.             captures the second indirect 
barriers to arbitrage and is measured by the standard deviation of weekly log price 
difference of two share series. The third proxy for indirect barrier is       which 
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measures the percentage of ownership by the ten largest shareholders. It varies from less 
than 40% to more than 98% and averages at 80%, indicating that the ownership of the 
sample companies is relatively concentrated that on average 80% of the companies’ shares 
is held by the ten largest shareholders.  
 
The second part of Panel A reports the result for other independent variables, one, 
        , controls for trading activities in two markets and three others account for firm 
characteristics.           is the ratio of trading volume in two markets. Time series of 
weekly volume ratio is firstly calculated and then averaged through time for individual 
company. A value of one indicates that the average weekly volume in China’s A-share 
market equals that in Hong Kong. A value larger than one suggests relatively more intense 
trading behavior in China and vice versa. The result shows that it varies drastically among 
sample firms with a maximum ratio of 9.4 and a minimum ratio of 0.1. On average, the 
weekly trading volume of our sample firms in China is two times that in Hong Kong’s 
stock market.      controls for the size effect documented in many related empirical 
studies and is proxied in this study by the total number of shares issued by a company. It is 
relatively stable during our sub-sample period and suits our intention to examine the long-
run relationship between firm size and average price difference.      measures the number 
of years that the companies’ shares are listed in Hong Kong stock market. It shows that 
companies in our sample have a shortest listing history of 5 years and a longest history of 
20 years.  
 
Panel B reports the correlation matrix among firm-level variables, revealing some mild 
correlation between factors. For example, dummy variable representing shortability in 
China’s stock market is positively correlated with size of the firm, which is understandable 
given the fact that the shares eligible for short selling in the early stage of development are 
largely lag-cap stocks on the market constituting major indexes. Listing years’s negative 
correlation with shortability and size is also comprehensive in that many mega-cap 
companies like national banks and petroleum producers perform their IPO in the late 2000s, 
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and are also among the first group of companies that are allowed to be sold short. 
Furthermore, the third proxy for indirect barrier, ownership concentration, is negative 
correlated with measure of trading activity but positive associated with size of the firm, 
suggesting that small cap companies have a less concentrated ownership, and that the more 
dispersed the shareholder base the more intense the trading in China’s A-share market, 
which echoes institutions’ preference for large-cap stocks and the fact that China’s stock 
market is more flooded with retail investors comparing to Hong Kong’s stock market.   
 
5.2.4. Model and Estimation 
 
In the same spirit with Pontiff (1996) and Gemmill and Thomas (2002), we estimate a 
cross-sectional regression of the form 
 
(5)                                                                   
                                                                           
 
where       is the log difference between A-share price and H-share price for company i; 
       is a dummy variable indicating the shortability of company i’s shares in China’s 
stock market;       is the dummy variable that equals to one if the company’s shares in 
China’ s A-share market are at least once traded by foreign institutional investors. The 
value of both dummy variables is assigned based on real transaction and holding history of 
domestic short sellers or foreign investors.          is a dummy variable that equals to 
one if the company has a dividend paying history over the sample period. The rest of the 
independent variables are consistent with the settings laid out in the previous part. 
 
Estimated coefficients with full set of variables are given in column 1 of Table 9. The 
results indicate that one direct barrier, shortability, all three proxies for indirect barriers, a   
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Table 9. Cross-sectional analysis 
The following table reports result of multiple specifications of the regression model:   
                                                                   
                                             , 
where        is the individual sensitivity to average price difference;             is the standard 
deviation of weekly price difference;        is the percentage ownership held by the ten largest 
shareholders of the company;           is the ratio of trading volume in A-share market relative to that 
in H-share market.       is proxied by the total shares outstanding;       is the year of listing in Hong 
Kong stock market;      is return on equity;           is a dummy variable that equals to one when 
the company has a dividend paying history over the sample period. The subscript i denotes company. T-
values are shown in parentheses. ** represents significance at 5% level, and * represents significance at 
10% level.  
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
1 2 3 
Constant -0.28 
(-0.64) 
-0.40 
(-1.12) 
0.09 
(0.30) 
Short -0.31 
(-3.11)** 
-0.33 
(-3.46)** 
-0.35 
(-3.65)** 
QFII 0.05 
(0.63) 
 0.03 
(0.34) 
Noise factor -0.32 
(-3.86)** 
-0.32 
(-3.98)** 
-0.36 
(-4.13)** 
Volatility 0.43 
(3.55)** 
0.43 
(3.69)** 
0.53 
(4.07)** 
Ownership 1.13 
(3.17)** 
1.03 
(3.17)** 
0.19 
(0.58) 
Volume Ratio 0.09 
(3.96)** 
0.09 
(4.39)** 
 
Log of size -0.03 
(-0.84) 
  
Listing year -0.02 
(-2.00)** 
-0.02 
(-1.85)* 
 
ROE -0.03 
(-2.17)** 
-0.03 
(-2.97)** 
 
Dividend -0.05 
(-0.44) 
  
    
R-Squared 74.76% 73.99% 54.28% 
Adj.R-Squared 67.75% 69.2% 48.70% 
F-test 10.67 15.78 9.73 
 
factor capturing trading behavior and two firm attribute are significant in explaining the 
cross-sectional variation in long-term pricing difference. Specifically, firms that are eligible 
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to short in China’s stock market, with less idiosyncratic noise trader risk, less volatile price 
differences, more dispersed shareholder base, longer listing history and higher firm 
performance have a relatively less severe problem of relative mispricing between two 
markets.  
 
Given the dependent variable as ln(PA/PH), the coefficient of Short indicates that the group 
of companies that are allowed to sell short in China’s A-share market enjoy a 25% lower 
price ratio than the rest of sample companies. This amount may mitigate the relative 
overvaluation associated with A-shares and even lower the A-share prices below their H-
share counterparts, especially during the last year of sample period when Hong Kong stock 
market exhibit aggressive increase while China’s stock market remains relatively sluggish. 
The magnitude of coefficients shows that three indirect barriers to arbitrage make a larger 
difference on the pricing consistency than those direct barriers, confirming the influence of 
indirect barriers in deterring arbitrage behavior and correcting relative mispricing even in 
the absence of any direct barriers. Furthermore, the significantly negative sign of noise 
factor solves the puzzle mentioned in Gemmill and Thomas (2002) and confirms the notion 
suggested in Merton (1987) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) that idiosyncratic risk matters 
more in arbitrageurs’ taking of positions, especially when the markets under consideration 
are segmented.  
 
The significant coefficient of trading activity echoes previous studies in China’s foreign 
share discount as well as mainstream literature about volume’s influence on share prices. 
Specifically, one unit increase of the average volume ratio leads to 9% higher A-share 
prices relative to H-shares, suggesting that those that are heavily traded in China’s A-share 
market are more likely to be over-valued and thus have a higher pricing gap with their H-
share counterparts in Hong Kong stock market.  
 
Two proxies for firm attributes, listing year and ROE, are significant in predicting the 
average price difference. The impact is respectively 2% and 3%. In particular, one year 
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longer of the company’s listing history on Hong Kong Stock Exchange is coupled with 2% 
smaller pricing gap between A- and H-shares. Likewise, higher firm performance as 
captured by ROE is associated with a 3% lower pricing difference on average. These results 
confirm Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) argument that younger stock and unpredictable stocks 
are more difficult to value and also tend to be avoided by arbitrageurs. Moreover, although 
insignificant, the coefficient of size and dividend all have expected signs, confirming Baker 
and Wurgler’s (2006) prediction toward small cap and non-dividend paying companies.   
 
The results after leaving out those insignificant variables are presented in column 2. Most 
of the remaining factors become more significant except for listing year, which turns 
insignificant probably due to its negative correlation with the removed size of the firm, as 
depicted in the correlation analysis. The same is true for concentration of ownership in 
column 3 after excluding all controlling variables and keeping only proxies for arbitrage 
barriers. It may become insignificant due to its mildly negative association with one of the 
control variables, the volume ratio. Collectively, results in column 3 show that direct and 
indirect barriers to arbitrage explain 54% of the cross-sectional fluctuation of pricing 
differences. This exceeds the largest explaining power of 46% found in empirical study by 
Chan, Menkveld and Yang (2008) with proxies for information asymmetry in China’s stock 
market.  
 
The estimates of QFII dummy representing those companies invested by foreign investors 
do not have expected sign in either model. The coefficient of QFII being positive indicates 
that, given the same level of other variables, companies whose shares are traded by foreign 
institutions in China have a larger pricing discrepancy with their H-share counterparts in 
Hong Kong, undermining the role of capital flow and foreign investment in aligning the 
pricing of identical assets. However, when we regress log price difference on QFII dummy 
exclusively, the estimate becomes negative even though still not significant. This may due 
to, although rather weakly as pointed out in the correlation analysis, its positive correlation 
with the dummy for shortability, for the large cap stocks that are allowed to sell short may 
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also be the target of foreign institutional investors, or with other proxies for indirect barriers, 
suggesting that foreign institutions actively seek exposure to shares with higher systematic 
noise factor and/or more volatile prices difference between A- and H-shares.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper investigates China’s foreign share discount relative to the price of shares 
restricted only to domestic investors. It is argued that whatever the reason that gives rise to 
the pricing difference, the lack of arbitrage mechanism in some markets and costly 
arbitrage in others enables them to persist. Textbook arbitrage behavior involves buying the 
relatively undervalued and selling the relatively overvalued simultaneously. Limits to this 
kind of arbitrage activity can take many forms, two of which that are more critical in our 
case of shares listed in two markets are inaccessibility to markets and short selling 
restrictions in either market.  
 
The effect of relaxation on these two direct barriers on relative asset pricing is examined 
with a sample of shares listed both on Hong Kong stock market, an open and advanced 
stock market, and one of China’s stock markets shortly established in the early 1990s. It is 
found that large pricing differences documented in previous studies decrease with the 
openness of China’s market proxied by the amount of capital flows approved by the 
authority. Moreover, the lifting of short sales restriction also contributes to the narrowing 
gap of share prices in two markets.  
 
Given the fact that the price gap still exists and differs across firms, we further this analysis 
by relating various indirect barriers suggested in recent studies on arbitrage behavior to the 
cross-sectional fluctuation in price difference. We want to see whether these indirect 
barriers deter rational arbitrage and prolong relative mispricing and whether they can 
explain the cross-firm variation of long-term price gaps. Three proxies for indirect barriers 
to arbitrage are constructed based on previous studies, which are noise trader risk, volatility 
of differences and ownership concentration. In a cross-sectional regression, we document 
that these proxies of indirect barriers along with those two direct barriers collectively 
explain 54% of the long-term different levels of pricing discrepancy across firms. 
Specifically, shares that are shortable in China’s stock market and that have less 
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idiosyncratic risk, less volatile price difference and dispersed shareholder base have a 
narrower gap of pricing difference in the long run. The result also shows that three indirect 
barriers to arbitrage make a larger difference on the pricing consistency than those direct 
barriers.  
 
The finding of this paper provides an alternative explanation for the China’s foreign share 
discount, especially the cross-sectional variation among firms. The analysis highlights a 
few attributes of price behavior, representing various indirect barriers to arbitrage, that 
make the speed of restoration to Law of One Price varies across firms. Compared with 
empirical studies in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the recent alleviation of two direct 
barriers, relaxation of restriction on capital flows and short selling activity, allows us to 
isolate and explore the role of indirect barriers in the persistence of pricing differences. 
 
Moreover, the examination of relation between time-varying pricing difference and the 
amount of free capital flows in China’s stock market contributes to the study of emerging 
market liberalizations. The unique setting of cross-listing focused in this study provides 
opportunity to test any efficiency gains associated with China’s recent liberalizing reforms 
without biased by Fama’s (1976) joint hypothesis issue. The result shows that two regime 
switches in China’s stock market all are contributive to the narrowing pricing gap between 
it and the more advanced Hong Kong stock market, suggesting that various artificial 
constraints imposed by the authority successfully segment the markets and the removal or 
mitigation of them significantly improve the pricing consistency of the market with 
international financial markets.  
 
Finally, this paper extends and contributes to the literature of arbitrage and its interplay 
with various anomalies. The findings suggest that both idiosyncratic and systematic risks 
matter in arbitrageurs’ attempt to eliminate those seemingly obvious anomalies. 
Specifically, shares associated with higher idiosyncratic risks are more likely to have a 
larger and sustained pricing difference in our case of cross-listed companies. This finding 
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confirms Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) model of not fully diversified arbitrageurs with 
limited resources and thus vetoes conventional models of many diversified, all-powerful 
arbitrageurs such as that suggested by Delong et al. (1990).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
63 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Alexander, Gordon J., Cheol S. Eun & S. Janakiramanan (1988). International Listings and 
Stock Returns: Some Empirical Evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis 23:2, 135-151. 
 
Ali, A., Hwang, L.S. & Trombley. M. A. (2003). Arbitrage Risk and the Book-to-Market 
Anomaly. Journal of Financial Economics 69,355-373. 
  
Arquette, Gregory C., William O. Brown Jr. & Richard C.K. Burdekin (2008). US ADR 
and Hong Kong H-share Discounts of Shanghai-Listed Firms, Journal of Banking & 
Finance 32, 1916-1927. 
 
Bailey, Warren (1994). Risk and Return on China’s New Stock Markets: Some Preliminary 
Evidence. Pacific Basin Finance Journal 2, 243-260. 
 
Bailey, Warren & J. Jagtiani (1994). Foreign Ownership Restrictions and Stock Prices in 
the Thai Capital Market. Journal of Financial Economics 36, 57-87. 
 
Baker, Malcolm & Jeffrey Wurgler (2006). Investor Sentiment and the Cross-Section of 
Stock Returns. Journal of Finance 61:4, 1645-1680. 
 
Bekaert, Geert & Campbell R. Harvey (2000). Foreign Speculators and Emerging Equity 
Markets. Journal of Finance 55:2, 565-614. 
 
Bris, Arturo, William N. Goetzmann & Ning Zhu (2007). Efficiency and the Bear: Short 
Sales and Markets Around the World. Journal of Finance 62:3, 1029-1079. 
 
Bodurtha, James N. Jr, Dong-Soon Kim & Charles M.C. Lee (1995). Closed-End Country 
Funds and U.S. Market Sentiment. Review of Financial Studies 8:3, 879-918. 
64 
 
 
 
Bonser-Neal, Catherine, Greggory Brauer, Robert Neal & Simon Wheatley (1990).  
International Investment Restrictions and Closed-End Country Fund Prices. Journal 
of Finance 45:2, 523-547.  
 
Chan, Kalok, Albert J. Menkveld & Zhishu Yang (2008). Information Asymmetry and 
Asset Prices: Evidence from the China Foreign Share Discount. Journal of Finance 
63:1, 159-196. 
 
Chan, Kalok & Johnny K.H. Kwok (2005). Market Segmentation and Share Price Premium: 
Evidence from Chinese Stock Markets. Journal of Emerging Market Finance 4:1, 
43-61. 
 
Chang, Eric C., Joseph W. Cheng & Yinghui Yu (2007). Short-Sales Constraints and Price 
Discovery: Evidence from the Hong Kong Market. Journal of Finance 62:5, 2097-
2121. 
 
Delong, J. Bradford, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence Summers, & Robert J. Waldmann (1990). 
Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets. Journal of Political Economy 98, 703-738. 
 
Dennis, Patrick J. & Deon Strickland (2002). Who Blinks in Volatile Markets, Individuals 
or Institutions? Journal of Finance 57:5, 1923-1949. 
 
Domowitz, Ian, Jack Glen & Ananth Madhavan (1997). Market Segmentation and Stock 
Prices: Evidence from an Emerging Market. Journal of Finance 52:3, 1059-1085.  
 
Ernst & Young Publication (2013). Investing in China Securities Market through the QFII 
Scheme. 
 
65 
 
 
Errunza, Vihang & Etienne Losq (1985). International Asset Pricing under Mild 
Segmentation: Theory and Test. Journal of Finance 40:1, 105-124. 
 
Eun, Cheol S. & S. Janakiramanan (1986). A Model of International Asset Pricing with a 
Constraint on the Foreign Equity Ownership. Journal of Finance 41:4, 897-914. 
 
Fama, E. (1976). Foundations of Finance: Portfolio Decisions and Security Prices. Basic 
Books, New York.  
 
Fernald, John & John H. Rogers (2002). Puzzles in the Chinese Stock Market. Review of 
Economics and Statistics 84:3, 416-432. 
 
Figlewski, Stephen (1981). The Informational Effects of Restrictions on Short Sales: Some 
Empirical Evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 16, 463-476. 
 
Gagnon, Louis & G. Andrew Karolyi (2010). Multi-Market Trading and Arbitrage. Journal 
of Financial Economics 97, 53-80.  
 
Gemmill, Gordon & Dylan C. Thomas (2002). Noise Trading, Costly Arbitrage, and Asset 
Prices: Evidence from Closed-End Funds. Journal of Finance 57: 6, 2571-2594.  
 
Gultekin, Mustafa N., N. Bulent Gultekin & Alessandro Penati (1989). Capital Controls 
and International Capital Market Segmentation: The Evidence from the Japanese 
and American Stock Markets. Journal of Finance 44:4, 849-869. 
 
Henry, P.B. (2000). Stock Market Liberalization, Economic Reform, and Emerging Market 
Equity Prices. Journal of Finance 55:2, 529-564. 
 
Hietala, Pekka (1989). Asset Pricing in Partially Segmented Markets: Evidence from the 
Finnish Market. Journal of Finance 44:3, 697-715. 
66 
 
 
 
Jones, Charles M. & Owen A. Lamont (2002). Short-Sale Constraints and Stock Returns. 
Journal of Financial Economics 66, 207-239. 
 
Karolyi G. Andrew, Lianfa Li & Rose Liao (2009). A (Partial) Resolution of the Chinese 
Discount Puzzle: The 2001 Deregulation of the B-Share Market. Journal of 
Financial Economic Policy 1:1, 80-106. 
 
Karpoff, Jonathan M. (1987). The Relation between Price Changes and Trading Volume: A 
Survey. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 22:1, 109-126. 
 
Kondor, Peter (2009). Risk in Dynamic Arbitrage: The Price Effects of Convergence 
Trading. Journal of Finance 64:2, 631-655. 
 
Lee, Charles M. C., Andrei Shleifer & Richard H. Thaler (1991). Investor Sentiment and 
the Closed-End Fund Puzzle. Journal of Finance 46:1, 75-109. 
 
Lee, Charles M. C. & Bhaskaran Swaminathan (2000). Price Momentum and Trading 
Volume. Journal of Finance 55:5, 2017-2069. 
 
Li, Bijing, Ronghua Yi & Roger Su (2011). Spillover Effect of Chinese Cross-Listed 
Companies across Shanghai, Hong Kong and US Markets. International Journal of 
Economics and Finance 3:6. 
 
Li, Xi & Sullivan, Rodney (2011). The Limits to Arbitrage Revisited: The Accrual and 
Asset Growth Anomalies. Financial Analysts Journal 67:4.  
 
Mei, Jianping, Jose A. Scheinkman, & Wei Xiong (2003). Speculative Trading and Stock 
Prices: an Analysis of Chinese A-B Share Premia. Unpublished. Bendheim Center 
for Finance, Princeton University.  
67 
 
 
 
Mendenhall, R. (2004). Arbitrage Risk and Post-Earnings Announcement Drift. Journal of 
Business 77, 875-894. 
 
Miller, E. (1977). Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion. Journal of Finance 32:4, 
1151-1168. 
 
Mittoo, Usha R. (1992). Additional Evidence on Integration in the Canadian Stock Market. 
Journal of Finance 47:5, 2035-2054. 
 
Merton, Robert (1987). A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete 
Information. Journal of Finance 42, 482-510. 
 
Murray, Michael P. (2005). Econometrics: A Modern Introduction. 1
th
 edition. Prentice 
Hall. ISBN-13: 978-0321113610.  
 
Nishiotis, George P. (2004). Do Indirect Investment Barriers Contribute to Capital Market 
Segmentation? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 39:3, 613-630. 
 
Peng, Wensheng, Hui Miao & Nathan Chow (2007). Price Convergence between Dual-
Listed A and H Shares. China Economic Issues 6:7.  
 
Pontiff, Jeffrey (1996). Costly Arbitrage: Evidence from Closed-End Funds. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 111, 1135-1151. 
 
Pontiff, Jeffrey (2006). Costly Arbitrage and the Myth of Idiosyncratic Risk. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics42, 35-52. 
 
Qiao, Zhuo, Thomas C. Chiang & Wing-Keung Wong (2008). Long-run Equilibrium, 
Short-term Adjustment, and Spillover Effects across Chinese Segmented Stock 
68 
 
 
Markets and the Hong Kong Stock Market. Journal of International Financial 
Markets, Institutions & Money 18, 425-437. 
 
Seaholes, Mark S. & Clark Liu (2011). Trading Imbalances and the Law of One Price. 
Economics Letters112, 132-134. 
 
Shleifer, Andrei & Robert W. Vishny (1997). The Limits of Arbitrage. Journal of Finance 
52:1, 35-55.  
 
Stateman, Meir, Steven Thorley & Keith Vorkink (2006). Investor Overconfidence and 
Trading Volume. Review of Financial Studies 19:4, 1531-1565. 
 
Stulz, Rene M. (1981). A Model of International Asset Pricing. Journal of Financial 
Economics 32, 383-406. 
 
Stulz, Rene M. (1999). Globalization of Equity Markets and the Cost of Capital. 
Unpublished. Paper presented at SBF/NYSE Conference on Global Equity Markets, 
Paris, 1999. 
 
Stulz, Rene M. & Walter Wasserfallen (1995). Foreign Equity Investment Restrictions, 
Capital Flight, and Shareholder Wealth Maximization: Theory and Evidence. 
Review of Financial Studies 8:4, 1019-1058. 
 
Sun, Qian, Wilson H.S. Tong (2000). The Effect of Market Segmentation on Stock Prices: 
the China Syndrome. Journal of Banking & Finance 24, 1875-1902. 
 
Wang, James, Kelvin Gao & Sheldon Chen (2013). Introduction of Newly-Issued Rules on 
the Pilot Program of Domestic Securities Investment by RMB Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors (“RQFII”). Publication of Han Kun Law Offices.  
 
69 
 
 
Wang, Steven Shuye & Li Jiang (2004). Location of Trade, Ownership Restrictions, and 
Market illiquidity: Examining Chinese A- and H- shares. Journal of Banking & 
Finance 28, 1273-1297. 
 
Wurgler, J. & Zhuravskay, E. (2002). Does Aribitrage Flatten Demand Curves for Stocks? 
Journal of Business 75, 583-607.  
 
Yang, Aidan & Honglin Wang (2012). What are the Challenges and Problems Facing 
China’s Outward Portfolio Investment: Evidence from the Qualified Domestic 
Institutional Investors Scheme. Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research 
Working Paper No.31/2012. 
 
 
  
70 
 
 
APPENDIX. Cross-listed companies in the sample 
Ticker 
Company 
Listing Date 
H-share A-share H-share A-share 
168 600600 Tsingtao Brewery Co. Ltd. 15/07/1993 27/08/1993 
177 600377 Jiangsu Expressway Co. Ltd. 27/06/1997 16/01/2001 
300 600806 Shenji Group Kunming Machine Tool Co. Ltd. 07/12/1993 03/01/1994 
317 600685 Guangzhou Shipyard International Co. Ltd. 06/08/1993 28/10/1993 
323 600808 Ma'anshan Iron&Steel Co. Ltd 03/11/1993 06/01/1994 
338 600688 Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Co. Ltd. 26/07/1993 08/11/1993 
347 000898 Angang Steel Company Limited 24/07/1997 25/12/1997 
358 600362 Jiangxi Copper Co. Ltd. 12/06/1997 11/01/2002 
386 600028 China Petroleum&Chemical Co. Ltd. 19/10/2000 08/08/2001 
390 601390 China Railway Group Ltd. 07/12/2007 03/12/2007 
525 601333 Guangshen Railway Co. Ltd. 14/05/1996 22/12/2006 
548 600548 Shenzhen Expressway Co., Ltd.  12/03/1997 25/12/2001 
588 601588 Beijing North Star Co. Ltd. 14/05/1997 16/10/2006 
670 600115 China Eastern Airlines Co. Ltd. 05/02/1997 05/11/1997 
719 000756 Shandong Xinhua Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. 31/12/1996 06/08/1997 
753 601111 Air China Ltd. 15/12/2004 18/08/2006 
763 000063 ZTE Corp. 09/12/2004 18/11/1997 
857 601857 PetroChina Co. Ltd 07/04/2000 05/11/2007 
874 600332 Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. 30/10/1997 06/02/2001 
902 600011 Huaneng Power International.Inc 21/01/1998 06/12/2001 
914 600585 Anhui Conch Cement Co. Ltd 21/10/1997 07/02/2002 
939 601939 China Construction Bank Co. Ltd. 27/10/2005 25/09/2007 
991 601991 Datang International Power Generation Co. Ltd. 21/03/1997 20/12/2006 
995 600012 Anhui Expressway Co. Ltd. 13/11/1996 07/01/2003 
998 601998 China CITIC Bank Co. Ltd. 27/04/2007 27/04/2007 
1053 601005 Chongqing Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. 17/10/1997 28/02/2007 
1055 600029 China Southern Airlines Co. Ltd. 31/07/1997 25/07/2003 
1065 600874 Tianjin Capital Environmental Protection Group Co. Ltd. 17/05/1994 30/06/1995 
1071 600027 Huadian Power International Co. Ltd. 30/06/1999 03/02/2005 
1072 600875 Dongfang Electronic Co. Ltd. 06/06/1994 10/10/1995 
1088 601088 China Shenhua Energy Co. Ltd. 15/06/2005 09/10/2007 
1138 600026 China Shipping Development Co. Ltd. 11/11/1994 23/05/2002 
1171 600188 Yanzhou Coal Mining Co. Ltd. 01/04/1998 01/07/1998 
1186 601186 China Railway Construction Co. Ltd. 13/03/2008 10/03/2008 
1398 601398 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd. 27/10/2006 27/10/2006 
1898 601898 China Coal Energy Co. Ltd. 19/12/2006 01/02/2008 
1919 601919 China COSCO Holdings Co. Ltd. 30/06/2005 26/06/2007 
2318 601318 Ping'An Insurance Co. Ltd. 24/06/2004 01/03/2007 
2600 601600 Aluminum Co. of China Ltd. 11/03/2004 30/04/2007 
2628 601628 China Life Insurance Co. Ltd. 12/12/2001 30/04/2007 
2727 601727 Shanghai Electronic Group Co. Ltd. 28/04/2005 05/12/2008 
2866 601866 China Shipping Container Lines Co. Ltd. 18/12/2003 09/01/2007 
   2883    601808 China Oilfield Services Ltd. 16/06/2004 12/12/2007 
   2899 601899 Zijing Mining Group Co. Ltd. 20/11/2002 28/09/2007 
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   3328 601328 Bank of Communications Co. Ltd 23/06/2005 15/05/2007 
   3968 600036 China Merchants Bank Co. Ltd 22/09/2006 09/04/2002 
   3988 601988 Bank of China Ltd. 01/06/2006 05/07/2006 
 
